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I. INTRODUCTION
Patents are big business. Individuals and companies are ob-
taining far more patents today than ever before.4 Some simple cal-
culations make it clear that companies are spending over $5 billion
a year obtaining patents in the U.S.-to say nothing of the costs of
obtaining patents elsewhere, and of licensing and enforcing the
patents.5 There are a number of reasons why patenting is on the
rise; primary among them are a booming economy and a shift away
from manufacturing and capital-intensive industries towards com-
panies with primarily intellectual assets. But whatever the reason,
it is evident that many companies consider patents important.
We set out to investigate who is obtaining patents in what
areas of technology and what characterizes those patents. To ac-
complish this, we collected a random sample of 1000 utility patents
issued between 1996 and 1998. We then identified a large number
4. PTO statistics indicate that it issued 163,209 patents in 1998, up from 124,146 in 1997.
See PTO Patents Up in 1998, 57 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 347 (Feb. 25, 1999). For
recent data in representative years through 1995, see the Additional Information section of the
PTO's 1996 Annual Report, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual (last vis-
ited Nov. 21, 1997). Data for those re resentative years are:
Year US Pats. Foreign Pats. Total Pats. % Foreign
1983 32,871 23,989 56,860 42.2%
1986 38,126 32,734 70,860 46.2%
1989 50,185 45,354 95,539 47.5%
1992 59,760 49,968 109,728 45.5%
1995 64,562 49,679 114,241 43.5%
5. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SM. &
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 138 (2000) (performing this calculation). For more detailed statistics, see
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000)
[hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance]. This number reflects only the cost of paying lawyers'
and PTO fees and does not include the cost to clients of lost time and productivity.
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of facts about each of these patents. In this Article, we use this data
to predict the characteristics of patents being obtained in the
population as a whole. Further, we test a large number of relation-
ships between these patents, such as how nationality relates to
area of technology and how the size of the patentee relates to the
prosecution process. In so doing, we hope to advance the under-
standing that both scholars and practitioners have about modern
trends in patent prosecution. 6
Our most significant findings are:
* Patents are not exclusively (or even primarily) granted
for inventions that a layperson would think of as "high-
tech." The largest single category of inventions patented
during 1996-1998 was mechanical patents. On the other
hand, there were a large number of patents in certain
fields of technology, especially software, computers, and
semiconductors. 7
* U.S. patentees come from a very few countries. More than
half of all U.S. patents originate in the U.S., and more
than 97% come from just 12 countries around the world.
The overwhelming majority of U.S. patents come from in-
ventors in the developed world.
* The average time a patent spends in prosecution has in-
creased significantly since 1994, from 2.37 years8 to 2.77
years. Whatever the explanation, 9 the increased time in
prosecution puts pressure on the 20-year patent term
law.
* Patents tend to be granted to corporations and to collabo-
rative groups of inventors, not to individuals working
alone. More than 80% of all patents are assigned to a
company, and the typical patent has more than one listed
6. In a separate paper soon to come, we will conduct a study to determine how the charac-
teristics of patents have changed over time. This forthcoming study will perform the same type
of analysis as in the instant study, using, however, a randomly selected set of 1,000 patents in a
two-year period from twenty years earlier (mid-1976 to mid-1978), and comparing the results of
that study with the results of the present study.
7. Software and computer-related patents were significantly more prevalent in this sam-
ple than they were in our prior study, which included patents that were actually litigated during
the 1989-1996 period. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Valid-
ity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 217 (1998) (noting that semiconductors were not
identified as an area of technology in our recent study of litigated patents).
B. See Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA
Q.J. 369, 383-85 (1994) (reporting that in 1994, patents spent an average of 864 days in prosecu-
tion).
9. Two likely possibilities include the significant increase in applications and greater use
of conintuation practice during the transition period from the 17 to 20-year patent terms.
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inventor. Further, small entities (mostly individuals and
small businesses) patent a large number of mechanical
inventions and medical devices, but a very small percent-
age of most other sorts of inventions.
* Patents as a whole cite very little non-patent prior art.
The overwhelming majority of the art cited by the pat-
entee and the examiner consists of other patents, even in
industries where many inventions are not recorded in
that form. Among industries, however, software patents
actually cite more non-patent art than average.
* Different countries patent different types of technology.
Interestingly, and contrary to the conventional wisdom,
U.S. inventors are overrepresented relative to other na-
tions in mechanical inventions, medical devices, pharma-
ceuticals, and biotechnology, and are underrepresented in
computer, software, semiconductor, and electronics in-
ventions.
* Patents in different areas of technology differed signifi-
cantly in the prosecution process they endured. Chemical,
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology patents had a much
more involved prosecution process than average. Patent
applications in all three areas were significantly more
likely to be abandoned and refiled by the applicant one or
more times. They spent significantly longer in prosecu-
tion than other sorts of patents, perhaps because of the
refilings. 10 And the patents that ultimately issued in
these fields cited significantly more prior art than aver-
age. By contrast, electronics and mechanical patents
spent much less time in prosecution, were less likely to be
abandoned and refiled, and cited fewer references. 1 The
impression that the data leaves is of a patent prosecution
system that spends much more time and attention on
some sorts of patents than others.
• U.S. patents spend longer in prosecution than foreign
patents. This may, however, be related to two other
findings: U.S. patents disproportionately deal with tech-
nology areas that spend longer than average in prosecu-
tion, and U.S. patentees engage in the practice of aban-
10. Not surprisingly, we found that abandoning and re-filing an application added signifi-
cantly to the time spent in prosecution.
11. Software patents were an exception to this general industry trend, taking longer than
average to prosecute despite the fact that they were not often abandoned and refiled.
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donment and refiling to a greater extent than patentees
of any other country.
* U.S. patentees are more likely to be small entities than
foreign patentees. There is a tremendous variance by
country; Japanese patents are almost never owned by
small entities, while in the U.S., Taiwan, and several
other countries, 40% or more of the patents are owned by
small entities.
" U.S. patents also cite many more prior art references
than foreign patents, though once again this may be a
function of the area of technology.
" Patents owned by small entities spend significantly less
time in prosecution than patents owned by large entities,
despite the protestations to the contrary at recent con-
gressional hearings. However, small entity patents cite
more prior art on average than do large entity patents.
We proceed in four parts. In Part II, we survey the existing
empirical literature on patents. In Part III, we explain the method-
ology of our study. We then present the results of our study in Part
IV. Finally, we conclude in Part V by highlighting some of the im-
plications of our data.
II. EXISTING LITERATURE
The lack of empirical evidence on the function and impact of
the patent system has long been lamented.1 2 In recent years, a
number of scholars have begun to address this deficiency in a vari-
ety of ways. This scholarship addresses three basic types of ques-
tions: (1) why people patent, (2) what happens to patents after they
are issued, and (3) what sorts of things are patented.13
12. George Priest complained years ago that there was virtually no useful economic evi-
dence addressing the impact of intellectual property. See George Priest, What Economists Can
Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19 (1986). Fritz Machlup told Con-
gress that economists had essentially no useful conclusions to draw on the nature of the patent
system. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 55
(Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup). For a discussion of some of the disagreements
among historians over the impact of the patent system on innovation, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126-27 (2d ed. 2000).
These complaints may be unfair. As noted below, there is increasing attention in academic
circles to the relationship between patents and innovation. Our study is one piece in this puzzle,
albeit one focused on a portion of the problem that Priest might not consider the most important
one.
13. A fourth sort of work not catalogued here concerns the relationship between patents
and economic development. For work along these lines, see Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as
2000] 2103
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First, several researchers have focused attention on how
patents are perceived and used by firms in various economic sec-
tors. The 1987 study by Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter is a
prominent example. 14 There, the authors surveyed a large number
of high-level R & D executives in over one hundred industries to
identify preferences among patents, secrecy, lead time, and other
methods of protecting the competitive advantages of important new
processes and products. 15 Although the authors found significant
inter-industry variances, companies generally did not view patents
as the most effective means of encouraging innovation. 16 Indeed, in
some industries, patents were considered the least effective con-
tributor to innovation. 17
Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1661 (1990); JOSH LERNER, 150 YEARS OF
PATENT PROTECTION (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W7478, 2000).
14. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 798. Not surprisingly, patents were viewed as much less effective for proc-
esses than for products. See id. at 794-95. Among the most important reasons found by the
authors for the perceived limitations on the effectiveness of patents were the ease of inventing
around both process and product patents and doubts about patentability in the case of processes.
See id. at 803. Given their findings, the authors were led to question why firms were patenting
at an increasing rate. Although their research did not explore this question, a recent study by
Wesley Cohen and others directly addresses it. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Appropriability
Conditions and Why Firms Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sector,
Paper Presented at the Stanford Workshop on Intellectual Property and Industry Competitive
Standards, Stanford Law School April 17-18, 1998 (on file with authors). Before seeking to an-
swer this question, the Cohen study updates Levin's and finds that, across many manufacturing
sectors, patents are viewed as substantially less effective for appropriating the value of product
innovations than all other alternatives, with secrecy and lead time being the most preferred
alternatives. See id. The study finds a number of reasons why firms nonetheless seek patents.
Unsurprisingly, the most important reason given by respondents was to prevent others from
copying. See id. The authors recognize, however, that the importance of this reason could have
been exaggerated because many respondents may have viewed this as the most "socially desir-
able response." Id. The second most important reason was "blocking," or preventing other firms
from patenting related technology. Id. Blocking and related defensive motives may help explain
our finding that patent litigation commonly occurs long after the issuance of a patent. See Alli-
son & Lemley, supra note 7, at 237-38; see also Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, What is Behind
the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 28 RES. POLY 1 (1999) (examining why firms are increasingly
seeking patents and rejecting the explanation that the surge is due to changes in patent law).
But see Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research- Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 94-98 (1999).
For examples of other work along these lines, see John Bound et al., Who Does R & D and
Who Patents?, in PATENTS, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY (Zvi Griliches ed. 1984); Zvi Griliches et al.,
R&D, Patents and Market Value Revisited: Is there a Second (Technological Opportunity) Fac-
tor?, 1 ECON. INNOV. & NEW TECH. 183 (1991).
For a more detailed exploration of trends in patenting on an industry-by-industry basis, see
John H. Barton, The Impact of Contemporary Patent Law on Plant Biotechnology Research,
Paper Presented at the Stanford Workshop on Intellectual Property and Industry Competitive
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Second, many studies have attempted to determine what
people actually do with patents once they get them, and the related
question of how valuable those patents are. This class of studies has
several parts. A growing number of scholars have attempted to
value patents, either in absolute or relative terms, by reference to
the use that is made of them by the patentee or the citations made
to them by others.'8 Several other authors have evaluated patent
acquisition and licensing strategies in various industries through
case studies.' 9 One especially interesting study of licensing by Josh
Lerner in 1995 empirically examined the patenting behavior of 419
new biotechnology firms with varying litigation costs.2 0 One of
Lerner's key findings was that firms with relatively high litigation
costs are less likely to seek patents in those subclasses in which
there had been many patent damage awards to rivals, 21 especially
compared to those firms with lower litigation costs. 22
A smaller number of empirical studies have been conducted
on patent litigation. There are three comprehensive studies (in-
cluding a recent one we conducted) on how patents fare in litiga-
Standards, Stanford Law School, April 17-18, 1998 (on file with authors); BRONWYN HALL &
ROSEMARIE HAM ZIEDONIS, THE PATENT PARADOx REVISITED: DETERMINANTS OF PATENTING IN
THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY, 1980-1994 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. W7602, 1999).
18. See generally JEAN 0. LANJOUW ET AL., HOW TO COUNT PATENTS AND VALUE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: USES OF PATENT RENEWAL AND APPLICATION DATA (National Bureau
of Econ. Research Working Paper, 1996) (accounting for the extent firms value patents by ex-
amining renewal data and multi-country filings); cf. Mark Schankerman & Ariel Pakes, Esti-
mates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96
ECON. J. 1052 (1986) (attempting to value patents in Europe). For the patent citation approach,
see Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International Knowledge Flows: Evidence From Patent
Citations, 8 ECON. INNOV. & NEW. TECH. 105 (1999); BRONWYN H. HALL ET AL., MARKET VALUE
AND PATENT CITATIONS: A FIRST LOOK (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
W7741, 2000).
19. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); Josh
Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the
Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125 (1998); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Li-
ability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1293 (1996); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implica-
tions for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POLy 285 (1986).
20. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competition, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995).
21. See id. at 463, 478-79. These subclasses (over 120,000 total) exist within the patent
classification system maintained by the PTO. See id. at 466. Lerner's finding means that firms
with relatively high litigation costs are more likely to use litigation-avoidance patenting strate-
gies.
22. See id. at 478-79. Using a number of ingenious data collection and testing methods,
particularly in estimating relative litigation costs, Lerner contributes not only to the literature
on patenting strategy but also to the literature on the various effects that litigation and other
dispute resolution costs have on firms' behavior.
2000] 2105
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tion.23 Of the relatively few recent contributions to the empirical
literature on patent litigation, the work by Lanjouw and Lerner on
injunctive relief in patent cases is notable. 24 They evaluated a sam-
ple of 252 patent suits, testing the hypothesis that preliminary in-
junctive relief in patent litigation is used to impose costs on rivals.25
Coolley has also produced a useful empirical study of a purely de-
scriptive nature on patent infringement damages. 26 Lanjouw and
Schankerman evaluated data provided by the PTO about litigated
patents to determine the ways in which litigated patents differ from
the general patent pool.27 At least two other studies have at-
23. Two of these studies cover relatively early periods. The first, by P.J. Federico, provided
validity and infringement data for litigated patents reported in the United States Patent Quar-
terly ('U.S.P.Q.") during the years 1925-1954, with more in-depth study of patents litigated dur-
ing the years 1948-1954. Although Federico did not attempt to examine a large number of vari-
ables, he did examine overall validity rates in a relatively thorough manner, and in the 1948-
1954 portion of the study, he explored courts' treatment of uncited and cited prior art. See P.J.
Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 233 (1956). Federico found that
courts upheld the validity of patents in only about 30-40% of the cases in which validity was an
issue. See id. at 236. He also concluded that the prior art before the courts was often better than
that used by the PTO in issuing the patent, based on his observation that accused infringers
were generally more successful in convincing courts to invalidate patents on the basis of uncited
prior art than on the basis of cited prior art. See id. at 249. Our data in a prior study confirm
this observation. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 7, at 231-34.
The second study, first published by Koenig in 1974 and then updated through 1980, consti-
tutes the most extensive set of data ever gathered on patent litigation. See GLORIA K. KOENIG,
PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 1980). Koenig collected
all patent cases reported in the U.S.P.Q. in the years 1953-1978 to produce an array of descrip-
tive statistics. See id. at 5-70 to 5-78. She also selected a random sample of 150 patents from the
years 1953-1967 for more in-depth study. See id. Koenig looked at the various kinds of prior art
relied on by courts, and the ways in which uncited prior art played a role in the courts' decisions.
See id. at 5-25 to 5-69. Like Federico's data for 1925-1954, Koenig's data for 1953-1978 revealed
that district and circuit courts found patents valid only about 35% of the time. See id. at 4-41
n.35.2. Finding that most courts held patents invalid, Koenig noted the wide disparity of validity
rates across regional circuits and concluded that obviousness (or "lack of invention") was the
most frequently used basis for judicial invalidation of patents. Id. at 5-70 to 5-78.
The third and most recent comprehensive study is the one we conducted in 1998 covering all
final written decisions on patent validity from 1989 through 1996. See Allison & Lemley, supra
note 7.
24. See JEAN 0. LANJOUW & JOSH LERNER, PRELIMINARY INJUNcTIVE RELIEF: THEORY AND
EVIDENcE FROM PATENT LITIGATION (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
5689, 1996).
25. See id. Lanjouw and Lerner find that their data is consistent with the hypothesis that
preliminary injunctive relief is a predatory weapon in patent cases. See id.
26. See Ronald B. Coolley, Overview and Statistical Study of the Law on Patent Damages,
75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc Y 515 (1993). This study analyzed several factors from 152
decisions between 1982-1992 in which the amount of damages was reported. See id. Although
unstated in the article, it appears that both district court and Federal Circuit decisions were
included. The article also did not define the source of its data set, but apparently included deci-
sions reported in West reporters, the U.S.P.Q., and Lexis.
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tempted, with mixed success, to empirically analyze the decision-
making behavior of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit. 28
Finally, there is a small body of empirical work on patent
prosecution, the field to which this Article contributes. This work
attempts to define and explain the characteristics of patents them-
selves, rather than why they are obtained or how they are ulti-
mately used. Some of these studies are industry specific. For exam-
ple, Daniel Johnson has studied aspects of the prosecution process
in the context of biotechnology patents, evaluating in one particular
industry many of the characteristics we examine here across all in-
27. See JEAN 0. LANJOUW & MARK SCHANKERMAN, STYLIZED FAcTS OF PATENT LITIGATION:
VALUE, SCOPE AND OWNERSHIP (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W6297,
1997).
28. See Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often: Statistical
Study of the CAFC Patent Decision--1982-1988, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 385
(1989); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions:
1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151 (1995).
The Coolley study of Federal Circuit decision-making is quite difficult to use as a basis for
any type of statistical conclusion. In addition to not identifying the source of its data or at-
tempting a precise definition of its data set, the study has a number of data comparability prob-
lems. Some of these problems stem from the inclusion of design patent decisions, decisions on
appeal from all lower tribunals over which the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction, and
inclusion of all subjects of Federal Circuit decision and all types Federal Circuit judgments.
The Dunner study, on the other hand, provides much more useful descriptive statistics. This
research had the avowed objective of determining whether the Federal Circuit was "biased" in
favor of patents. Dunner et al., supra. Specifically, Dunner examined whether the Federal Cir-
cuit is generally more pro-patent than its predecessor patent appeals courts, namely, the re-
gional circuits and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals C'C.C.P.A."). The study was based
on 1302 Federal Circuit decisions of all kinds, many unreported; the source of the data set is not
clear. Although based on a very large data set that may present data comparability problems,
the study does include one portion that segregates Federal Circuit decisions on patent validity.
Like other studies of the Federal Circuit, the Dunner study found a much higher validity rate in
the Federal Circuit than had been found in district court and regional court of appeals decisions
prior to the Federal Circuits creation. This was found to be true both overall and with respect to
the individual grounds of novelty/statutory bars, obviousness, and description and claim ade-
quacy. See Dunner et al., supra, at 154. For other works in the area attempting to catalogue
particular aspects of Federal Circuit decisions, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Fed-
eral Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FL. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L
REv. 1 (1989).
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to serve, inter alia, as the only United States
court of appeals to review district court patent cases. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, P.L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)). Although not
relevant to our study, the same legislation also gave the newly created Federal Circuit appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
in instances where the Board had affirmed the patent examiner's rejection of a patent applica-
tion. This latter form of appellate jurisdiction had previously been the province of the C.C.P.A,
the existence of which was extinguished by the 1982 legislation. See id.
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dustries.29 Other studies cut across industries, but study only one
particular aspect of the prosecution process.80 To our knowledge,
however, ours is the first comprehensive study of the relationship
between multiple characteristics of patents across all major areas of
technology.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
We collected a random sample of 1,000 utility patents issued
in the United States during a two-year period. Starting with the
patent having the first number issued in the first week of June,
1996 and ending with the patent having the last number issued in
the last week of May, 1998, we then used a random-number genera-
tor to select a random sample of 1,000 patent numbers from this
population.3 1
For each patent in the sample, we obtained a wide variety of
information including the following: (1) PTO classification number
and PTO technology group (mechanical, chemical, or electrical); (2)
area of technology, among the 14 technology groups we defined, and
number of technology areas into which each patent fell; 32 (3) the
invention's country of origin;33 (4) filing date, U.S. and foreign pri-
ority dates, issue date, and time spent in prosecution;34 (5) the
number and type of filings to which each patent claimed priority, if
any; (6) small or large entity status and type of entity; (7) the num-
ber of inventors; (8) whether the patent had been assigned; (9)
whether the patent had a foreign assignee, and whether it had at
least one foreign inventor; (10) the number and type of prior art
29. See Daniel K.N. Johnson, Biotechnology Inventions: What Can We Learn From Pat-
ents? (unpublished manuscript, 2000) (on file with authors).
30. See, e.g., Chris L. Holm, Patent Prosecution Comparison Between the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 233 (1997) (studying
time spent in prosecution); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994) (same).
31. When a sample is truly random, the larger the sample, the more likely it will include
duplicate numbers. Knowing that this would be the case, to obtain a sample of 1,000 patent
numbers, we selected an initial sample of 1,050 randomly generated numbers. Fourteen of the
numbers were duplicates and were discarded. We then substituted the next 14, numbers 1,001-
1,014. The remainder of the initial 1,050 numbers were discarded. This method was a matter of
necessity that does not affect the randomness of the sample.
32. For more information on how we defined these groups, see infra text accompanying
notes 35-39.
33. For more information on how we defined country of origin, see infra text accompanying
notes 44-51.
34. Time spent in prosecution was determined by subtracting the first U.S. priority date
from the issue date.
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references cited on the face of the patent; and (11) the number and
type of claims contained in the patent.
Most of this data was available in the patent itself or easily
derived from information in the patent. There were two major ex-
ceptions. First, because we found the PTO's subject matter classifi-
cation scheme inadequate for our purposes, we classify the patents
in our sample into areas of technology that we have defined our-
selves.3 5 Second, information on the nature and size of the individ-
ual or entity that owns the patent is not available on the face of the
patent itself. However, patentees are required to file either small or
large entity status with the PTO; the size of the entity determines
the fees they pay. 36 Small entities are further divided into three
categories: individuals, non-profit organizations, and small busi-
nesses.37 This data is not published. However, the PTO generously
agreed to provide us with the data for the 1,000 patents in our
study.
Regarding our attempt to define areas of technology, one
must understand that the act of defining areas of technology in to-
day's world is as much art as it is science. Some might reasonably
disagree with some of our definitions; although almost all of our
fourteen areas are susceptible to more than one definitional ap-
proach, we believe ours is at least as reasonable as other possible
alternatives. While it is possible to devise an almost endless list of
categories and subcategories, we chose the fourteen categories in
this study because they reflect the areas of technology into which
inventions in the sample generally fell. In many cases the catego-
ries also have significance in larger policy debates. For example,
while we could have decided not to separate out software patents
from the computer-related category, there is enough debate about
software patents that we thought it worth analyzing them sepa-
rately.38 Following are the definitions of technology areas employed
35. Similarly, we did not use the "Canadian Concordance" between PTO classifications and
industries because we believe the PTO classifications themselves are sometimes suspect.
36. The report is made by the applicant and is not verified by the PTO. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §509.03 (7th ed. West 1998).
Misrepresenting entity size is illegal and can theoretically invalidate the patent. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.9(f) (1999); but cf. DH Tech. Inc. v. Synergystex Inel, 154 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting
that innocent failure to pay large entity fee can be corrected later). Thus, these self-reports
generally should be accurate.
37. An entity is defined by the PTO as "small" if it meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 41(h)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 2000), which incorporates by reference section 3 of the Small
Business Act.
38. The patents collected in our study were issued before the Federal Circuies 1998 deci-
sion in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), which permitted the patenting of "business methods." Id. We therefore did not attempt to
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in this study, listed in the order in which they appeared in our
spreadsheet columns.
(1) Pharmaceutical: Any process or substance to be used in
the diagnosis or treatment of diseases or other medical conditions
in humans or animals, including processes or substances used in
medical research. In this data set, a technology classified as Phar-
maceutical will also be within either the Chemistry or Biotechnol-
ogy areas. 39
(2) Medical device: An apparatus to be used for the diagnosis
or treatment of diseases in humans or animals including appara-
tuses used in medical research. An invention classified as a medical
device will normally fall within at least one other classification,
such as computer-related, electronics, mechanics, acoustics, or op-
tics.
(3) Biotechnology: Any process or product involving advanced
genetic techniques intended to construct new microbial, plant, or
animal strains.
(4) Computer-Related: (a) Any process or product for im-
proving computer hardware (except for advances in semiconductor
technology, which are in a separate, mutually exclusive classifica-
tion). (b) An invention solely embodied in software. (c) Any inven-
tion in which a microprocessor or other integrated logic circuit is
expressed in the patent as being a critical part of the invention
(again excluding advances in semiconductor technology itself). Any
invention in part (c) of the Computer-Related classification will
necessarily also be classified in one or more other categories.
(5) Software: An invention that is completely embodied in
software, even if the claims of the patent refer to a system or article
of manufacture. A pure software invention is also placed in the
Computer-Related classification. The instructions embodied in
software code can often be embodied in semiconductor chips in a
device; this is done in the obvious instances of modern consumer
electronic devices, automobiles, and other devices in which the in-
structions are very specific to a particular function of the device
and the use of software for logic instructions simply is not practi-
break out business methods into a separate technology area. In any event, we did not encounter
any patents in our sample that fit the business methods category.
39. In an almost identical study we are doing on 1,000 randomly selected patents from
mid-1976 to mid-1978, we plan to separately analyze that 20-year-earlier data set and compare
those results with the results from this study. All of the patents in the 1970s sample classified
as Pharmaceutical were also classified as Chemistry, but none was also classified as Biotechnol-
ogy, presumably because the science was still in its infancy at that point.
[Vol. 53:6:20992110
WHO'S PATENTING WHAT?
cally feasible. Another researcher might include within the Soft-
ware classification those inventions in which the algorithms are
embodied in chips, but we have chosen to include within our defini-
tion of Software only those inventions that consist purely of soft-
ware that is not embodied in hardware.
(6) Semiconductor: A process or product intended to advance
the state of the art in researching, designing, or fabricating semi-
conductor computer chips.
(7) Electronics: A process or product in which the sole or a
critical part of the invention makes use of traditional electronic cir-
cuitry or involves electric energy storage. An invention in this clas-
sification may also be included in other classifications, including
chemistry, mechanics, or optics.
(8) Chemistry: A process that consists solely of chemical re-
actions, a product resulting from such a process, or an invention of
which a chemical process or product is a critical part. An invention
in the field of chemistry may be included in one or more other clas-
sifications, such as electronics or optics.
(9) Mechanics: A process or product that consists solely of
the use of mechanical parts, sometimes combined with heat, hy-
draulics, pneumatics, or other power sources; or an invention in
which the above is a critical part. Some inventions classified as me-
chanical also will be in one or more other classifications, such as
electronics. While many different types of inventions fit into this
category, it should not be confused with a catchall "other" category.
(10) Acoustics: A process or product that consists solely or as
a critical part of an invention using sound waves. Such an invention
may also be included in another classification, such as medical de-
vice or computer-related.
(11) Optics: A process or product intended to advance the
state of the art in the use of light waves or imaging. This may be its
sole purpose or it may be a critical part of an invention also having
other purposes. Optics technology often will also be classified in one
or more other areas, such as medical devices, semiconductors, elec-
tronics, or chemistry.
(12) Automotive-related: As expressed in the patent, an in-
vention that is intended for use with automobiles or trucks. An in-
vention in this classification necessarily will also be included within
another classification, such as mechanics, electronics, or computer-
related.
(13) Energy-related: As expressed in the patent, an invention
that intends to advance the state of the art in the production, proc-
essing, or transmission of energy. An invention is also included in
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this classification if its intended use is research into some aspect of
the production, processing, or transmission of energy. The defini-
tion of "energy" includes that produced by any means from any
source, including fossil fuels, nuclear power, electricity produced,
and the many forms of radiation. An invention in this classification
necessarily will also be included within another classification, such
as mechanics, electronics, acoustics (for example, seismological in-
ventions for detection of oil and gas), optics, chemistry, or com-
puter-related.
(14) Communications-related: As expressed in the patent,
any invention intended to improve the state of the art in communi-
cations. As in the other broad classifications, an invention placed in
this classification necessarily will also be included within another
classification, such as optics, electronics, or computer-related.
We separate our results into two parts. In the first part, we
use our sample as a tool to describe the approximate characteristics
of the larger population of issued patents. 40 Because our study cov-
ers only a sample, it cannot predict with perfect accuracy the char-
acteristics of the population as a whole. However, because the sam-
ple size is random and so large, the "confidence intervals," the
range within which we can be 95% (or 99%) confident the actual
number will fall, are quite small. In describing our results in this
first part, we have chosen to omit reference to the exact confidence
intervals unless they are important to the conclusions we identify.41
The second and larger set of results involves the evaluation
of relationships between different aspects of this data. We have
taken most of the characteristics identified in the first part and re-
lated them to each other. These relationship tests are all bivariate,
not multivariate. 42 Thus, we can predict with confidence that two
characteristics are related to each other, for example, the inven-
tion's country of origin and mean time spent in prosecution. How-
ever, it is likely that other factors, such as area of technology or
number of applications filed, contribute to explaining this relation-
40. More precisely, we are predicting the characteristics of the population we have defined,
which is utility patents issued in the United States during the mid-1996 to mid-1998 time period.
These results will not necessarily be predictive of patents issued outside that time period.
41. We do of course have the confidence intervals in our data set and will make them
available to scholars along with the larger data set. In Tables where we do report confidence
intervals, they are reported as margins of error in each direction from the reported mean, and
are calculated at a 95% confidence level.
42. In other words, we test only the relationship between two elements of the data we have
collected, not the relationship among three or more of those elements.
[Vol. 53:6:20992112
WHO'S PATENTING WHAT?2
ship. Thus, we wish to emphasize that we are not predicting cause
and effect, merely correlation.
IV. RESULTS
We present our results in two broad categories. In Section A,
we present the characteristics of the sample that we catalogued,
such as country of origin, area of technology, and time spent in
prosecution. This Section gives the reader a good understanding of
who is patenting what. In Section B, we relate these characteristics
to each other, seeking patterns that may illuminate important facts
about patent prosecution.
A. Characteristics of Issued Patents
As noted above, we collected a variety of facts about each is-
sued patent in the sample. These facts include the following: area of
technology, country of origin, the presence or absence of foreign pri-
ority, the number of prior U.S. filings, the time spent in prosecu-
tion, the nature and size of the entity prosecuting the patent, the
number of inventors, whether or not the invention was assigned,
whether the inventor or the assignee was foreign, the number and
type of references cited in the patent, and the number and type of
claims in the patent. In this Section, we use this data to predict the
descriptive characteristics of the larger population of patents issued
during 1996-1998. We describe the results of this analysis in the
sections that follow.
1. Area of Technology
We used two different measures of area of technology. First,
we used the PTO's classification system, which divides each patent
into the categories "Mechanical, Chemical, and Electrical." Second,
we also constructed our own set of fourteen technology categories by
examining each patent in detail.
The PTO classification system shows a roughly even division
into its traditional categories. Of the 1000 patents in the study, the
PTO classified 374 as "mechanical," 292 as "chemical," and 384 as
"electrical." This is roughly consistent with prior data, though the
numbers in our sample contain somewhat more electrical patents
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than in prior studies. 43 This may reflect a growing trend towards
patenting in certain fields the PTO generally classifies as electrical,
such as computer software.
We were not content to rely on the PTO classification sys-
tem, however, for two reasons. First, we did not find it particularly
reliable. In the course of this study, we came upon numerous in-
stances of what appear to us to be wrong or arbitrary classification
decisions. 44 Second, the PTO system groups together technologies
that may have very different characteristics. For example, pharma-
ceutical, petroleum, and biotechnology inventions would all be
classed as "chemicar' under the PTO system, even though the in-
dustries in question are very different. This problem is exacerbated
by the problem of inventions that cross over between industries,
such as bioinformatics or computer-controlled mechanical devices.
To deal with these problems, we designed a classification
system that is more finely graded than the PTOs. Further, we were
willing to class a particular patent in more than one category where
necessary. 45 The results of this classification system, sorted by fre-
quency, are presented in Table 1.
One striking result, even in the more finely tuned classifica-
tion system we have used, is how many patents were issued for
truly mechanical inventions: 329 out of 1,000 patents, or nearly
one-third.46 It is also notable how many inventions are in the gen-
eral field of computer-related inventions: 242 patents or nearly one-
43. A study of 2,081 patents issued in 1994 found that 874 were classified by the PTO as
mechanical, 604 as chemical, and 603 as electrical See Lemley, supra note 30, at 388 tbl. 2. In
that study, the PTO classified 29% of the patents as electrical and 29% as chemical. By contrast,
in our current study, using patents issued from 1996 through 1998, a virtually identical 29.2% of
the patents are chemical, but 33.4% are electrical.
44. Two of the many examples follow: (1) Pat. No. 5,525,451, "Photoreceptor Fabrication
Method," issued June 11, 1996. The PTO placed the patent within its Mechanical category, but a
reading of the patent reveals that it does not intend to advance the state of art in Mechanics;
instead, the patent clearly reveals that the inventors sought to advance the Optics and Com-
puter-Related arts. (2) Pat. No. 5,539,844, "Ball Bearing Cages and Ball Bearings," issued July
23, 1996. The PTO placed the patent within its Electrical category, when even a casual reading
of the patent reveals that it had nothing at all to do with electronics, but instead was purely
mechanical. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT DATABASE, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patft.
45. Indeed, this was quite common. The 1,000 patents we studied produced 1,489 total
technology areas, or an average of nearly 1.5 areas per patent. Some patents were classed in as
many as four different areas. See infra Table 1.
46. This is consistent with our earlier finding that most litigated patents are in mechanical
areas of technology. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 7, at 216-19. However, because that study
used a somewhat different classification system, the results are not strictly comparable.
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quarter, including 76 software inventions.47 Finally, 128 patents
were granted in optics and 22 in acoustics. The magnitude of these
numbers may be surprising because the media generally does not
pay much attention to optics or acoustics in their reporting on
booming technology areas.
Assuming these numbers are representative of patents is-
sued generally during this time period,48 there are an enormous
number of patents in force in many of these fields of technology.
Approximately 237,000 patents were granted in the United States
during the two years of our study.49 Of these patents, our sample
predicts that approximately 22,000 are semiconductor patents, and
18,000 are software patents.50 And of course these are only a small
fraction of the patents currently in force in the U.S.; many more
semiconductor and software patents were surely issued in the peri-
ods before June 1996 and have been issued since May 1998.51
2. Country of Origin
We also classed each patent by country of origin. Twenty-five
countries were represented in our sample; 12 of these countries had
five or more patents issued.52 In defining "country of origin," we
were concerned with identifying the nation in which the invention
47. Our definition of a computer-related invention along with our definitions of other tech-
nology areas, must be treated with care. For example, a software invention was also classified as
computer-related and should not be added to the computer-related category for the purpose of
arriving at a total number of patents in the computer area. Also, semiconductor inventions were
not included with the computer-related classification, but were included in a separate, mutually
exclusive category. Therefore, they could be added to the computer-related category for the pur-
pose of arriving at a total number of patents in the general computer area.
48. The numbers should be representative, given the randomness of the sample and the
large sample size. See generally AMIR D. ACZEL, COMPLETE BUSINESS STATISTICS 230-58 (4th ed.
1999) (discussing confidence intervals and their measurement in several sets of conditions).
49. A total of 369,149 patents were granted in the United States during the years 1996-
1998. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, tbl. Al (March 1999)
[hereinafter ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT]. Because our study covered only 24 months during
those years, we have included in our sample all of the 111,983 patents granted in 1997, 7/12 of
the 109,646 patents granted in 1996, and 5/12 of the 147,250 patents granted in 1998. These
numbers are only estimates, however, tallying patents issued by year rather than month.
50. These numbers are generated by multiplying the percentage of the sample composed of
each type of patent by the total number of patents issued during this two-year period.
51. Greg Ahronian estimates that there are now 80,000 software patents in force in the
United States. See Greg Ahronian, Internet Patent News Service, http://www.bustpatents.com.
While our numbers may be slightly more conservative than his, that estimate is not unrealistic.
52. The countries with less than five patents in the sample were the Cayman Islands (1),
Hong Kong (2), Singapore (2), India (1), Ireland (2), Austria (1), Belgium (3), Sweden (4), Norway
(2), Finland (3), Denmark (2), Israel (3), and the Czech Republic (1).
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itself originated. Thus, we generally looked at inventor domicile,
with assignee location used as a sort of "tie-breaker."
Summary results for those twelve countries having five or
more U.S. patents in our sample are presented in Table 2, organ-
ized by number of patents granted. These numbers are consistent
with those identified by the PTO for the population of patents is-
sued during this period.58 Notably, few countries are represented on
this list. The twelve countries listed in Table 2 together account for
97.3% of all patents issued in the sample. Of these, the U.S. ac-
counts for more than half, and the U.S. and Japan together for
more than 75%. Further, there were almost no patents issued on
behalf of inventors in countries outside of North America, Europe,
and the Pacific Rim, as is demonstrated in Table 3.
There were virtually no patents issued to inventors in the
developing world, with the exception of the fast-growing Asian
economies of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. At least in the United
States, patenting is done by inventors in the developed world.
We also examined each patent for the presence of one or
more foreign inventors, and for foreign assignees. A very substan-
tial 481 of the 1,000 patents had at least one foreign inventor. This
includes at least some patents that we classed as being of U.S. ori-
gin, because of cross-national inventorship. A similarly substantial
394 patents were assigned to foreign corporations, approximately
85.6% of the 460 patents we determined to be of foreign origin. This
number is virtually indistinguishable from the 85.1% figure, which
represents the percentage of assignments in the sample as a whole.
This suggests that foreign patents are no more likely to be assigned
to corporate owners than domestic patents.
3. Nature of Inventors and Owners
We also studied a number of characteristics about inventors
and patent ownership, including the number of inventors, whether
the invention was assigned, and the small entity status of the pat-
53. See ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 49, at tbl. A1-2. Slight discrepancies result
from the imperfection of predicting population characteristics from even a large sample and from
the slightly different definitions of "country of origin" used by the PTO. See id. at tbL A1-2 and
accompanying text. The PTO defines "country of origin" to be the residence of the first-named
inventor at the time the patent is issued. Although obviously easier than the approach we used
to determine country of origin, it is a cruder method and is more likely than not to misrepresent
the actual country in which the invention originated. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
By contrast, we developed a more nuanced method for determining the country in which the
invention originated.
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ent owner. These characteristics belie the traditional and once-
accurate notion of the typical inventor as an individual working
alone in his garage. Today, large corporations are obtaining the
overwhelming majority of patents. 54
Most inventions in our study were not developed by a single
individual. On average, each patent in our sample listed 2.26 inven-
tors; the median patent listed two inventors. At the extreme, one
patent listed as many as eleven inventors. While inventive collabo-
ration is certainly possible between individuals, it is one of the
hallmarks of "big science" at major corporations. Further, those in-
ventors assigned their patent rights to a corporate entity, typically
but not necessarily an employer, in an overwhelming 851 out of
1,000 cases. Finally, the PTO divides patentees into "large entities"
and "small entities," the latter a category that includes individuals
and non-profit corporations as well as small businesses. Of the
1,000 patents in our sample, 707 were assigned to large entities at
the time of issuance. 55 Of the 293 small entities, 118 were organiza-
tions, including 11 non-profit organizations and 107 small busi-
nesses. Individuals prosecuted the remaining 175 patents, demon-
strating that the individual inventor has certainly not disappeared
from the scene altogether.
These facts may be useful in the modern debate over the na-
ture of the patent system, though we are hesitant to draw any firm
conclusions on that score. The most significant debates over patent
reform of late have been debates about the impact of reform on in-
dividual inventors. Individual inventors successfully modified the
1999 American Inventors Protection Act to respond to their con-
cerns about delay and to permit them to avoid publication of their
patent applications.56 They have also blocked efforts to move the
U.S. from a "first-to-invent" to a "first-to-file" priority system, as
the rest of the world has done. Notwithstanding these efforts, pat-
enting in the U.S. today is something that is largely done by corpo-
rations, not individuals. 57
54. This supposition is borne out by the PTO statistics, which identify the entities-mostly
large companies-that own the most patents. See ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 49, at
tbl. B.
55. Patents are always issued in the name of the individual inventor or inventors. See 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 115, 116 (1994), amended by 35 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. IV 1998). Thus, a large entity
that owns a patent must have received it by assignment from the inventor, or by some compara-
ble mechanism of implied assignment. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 118, 261 (1994).
56. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 154(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).
57. It remains open to debate whether this means that the U.S. should stop trying to favor
individual inventors or redouble its efforts to do so.
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4. The Prosecution Process
Finally, we collected a variety of data about the prosecution
of the patents in the sample. Specifically, we studied the time spent
in prosecution, the total number of continuations, continuations-in-
part ("CIPs"), and divisionals filed by the applicant, whether they
claimed priority to a foreign application, the number and type of
prior art references cited in each patent, and the number of claims
in each patent.
We studied the time spent in prosecution, which we define as
the time from the filing of the first U.S. application to the issue
date.58 The question of how long patents spend in prosecution is
particularly important now, because the patent term was changed
in 1994 to run at least 20 years from the first filing date.59 Thus,
the longer a patent spends in prosecution, the less term it will gen-
erally have.60 On average, the patents issued in our sample spent
1,011 days, or 2.77 years, in prosecution. The median patent spent
rather less time in prosecution: 811 days, or 2.22 years. The range
of prosecution times varied widely, from a low of 1.16 years to a
high of 18.15 years. The mean prosecution time in this sample is
somewhat longer than that found in a study of patents issued in
1994. That study found a mean prosecution time of 864 days, or
2.37 years.61 Thus, it appears that patents issued in the 1996-1998
period took longer to get through the patent office than in 1994,
which is a result opposite of that predicted by Lemley in 1994.62
It is not clear what explains this change, but we note two
possible factors. First, the last several years have seen a dramatic
increase in the number of patent applications filed and patents is-
sued. In 1998, 243,062 patent applications were filed in the U.S., an
increase of 39.1% over the number filed five years earlier in 1993.
The patent office issued 147,520 patents in 1998, a 45.4% increase
over the number issued just three years earlier.63 Thus, it may not
58. Thus, where a patent application claims priority to one or more prior applications, the
date we report is the earliest priority date claimed. This is important because focusing only on
the most recently filed application would understate the total time a patent application spent at
the PTO. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 383-84.
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
60. The American Inventors Protection Act adds patent term in a number of cases involv-
ing appeal, interference, or delay by the PTO in issuing a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (b) (1994).
61. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 385 & tbl. 1.
62. See id. at 385-87 (predicting a 20% drop in pendency times). Since many of the patents
in our study issued on applications originally filed before 1995, however, Lemley's arguments
may still be valid, and may simply not have had time to take effect.
63. See ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 49, at tbl. Al.
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be surprising that pendency times have increased, given that the
workload of the PTO has increased markedly.64
Second, a significant change in the patent term went into ef-
fect for applications filed beginning June 8, 1995. Applications filed
after that date were treated under the 20-year patent term, while
applications filed before that date got the benefit of the longer of
patent terms calculated under the 17 and 20-year rules.65 Because
of uncertainty about patent terms under the 20-year rule, a larger-
than-normal number of patent applications were filed in the weeks
preceding the cut-off date. 66 Because that cut-off date occurred
while the applications in this sample were being filed, these new
filings may affect the characteristics of the sample. In particular,
anyone engaged in the practice of "submarine patenting" would
have a strong incentive to get a new application or CIP on file be-
fore June 8, 1995, in order to take advantage of the old 17-year pat-
ent term.67 This may, in turn, result in a sample that is not truly
representative because it contains a larger number of long prosecu-
tion periods than one would normally expect. However, while there
may be some difference, we do not think it can fully explain the re-
sult in this study.68
We also examined a number of other factors relating to pat-
ent prosecution. Patent applicants in our sample frequently relied
on prior applications, called parent or grandparent applications, for
priority in the patents that ultimately issued. These priority claims
fell into two categories. First, 394 of the 1,000 patents claimed pri-
ority under an international treaty based on a prior application
filed outside the United States. Since 460 patents originated out-
64. We have not collected data on the number of Examiners during the 1994 or 1996-1998
periods. It is therefore impossible to tell for sure whether the workload per Examiner has in-
creased.
65. See generally Lemley, supra note 30 (detailing the change).
66. In our sample, 32 applications claimed a priority date between May 22, 1995 and June
8, 1995, while only 11 claimed a priority date during a comparable period eight months earlier
(September 22 to October 10, 1994). Similarly, 83 applications in the sample had at least one
filing date (though not necessarily a priority date) during this period, compared with 15 in the
period eight months earlier.
67. "Submarine patenting" is the deliberate delaying of the issuance of a patent in order to
take a mature industry by surprise years later. See generally Lemley, supra note 30, at 377-80
(explaining how this can be accomplished).
68. One partial test of this hypothesis is to compare the difference between the mean and
median prosecution times in our study to the difference in the 1994 study. The more days by
which the mean exceeds the median, the more the mean has been increased by an asymmetric
"tail" of patents that spent an extremely long time in prosecution. The difference between the
mean and median in the 1994 study was 163 days, compared to 200 days in our sample. See
Lemley, supra note 30, at 385 tbl. 1. In percentage terms, however, the difference is minimal
(23.3% of the median time in prosecution in 1994, compared to 24.7% in our sample).
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side the U.S., this means that at least some foreign-owned patents
were filed first in the U.S. rather than in their home country. Sec-
ond, a significant minority of the patentees in the sample based
their priority on a prior U.S. application. Thus, 159 of the patents
claimed priority via at least one continuation application, 111 via a
CIP application, and 99 via a divisional application. 69 On average,
the total number of U.S. applications in a priority chain, including
the one that ultimately resulted in a patent, was 1.50. While the
median patent did not claim priority, some patents claimed priority
based on as many as nine different applications. On the other hand,
a plurality, 410 of the patents, did not claim priority to any previ-
ously filed application, in the U.S. or abroad.
The patents in our sample made reference to an average of
15.16 total pieces of prior art. The median patent cited 10 prior art
references; patents cited anywhere from a low of zero prior art ref-
erences to a high of 163 references. The data are presented in Ta-
ble 4.
We divided those references into three categories of prior art,
also noted in Table 4: prior U.S. patents, prior patents from outside
the U.S., and non-patent prior art. Citations in the sample were
overwhelmingly made to U.S. patents. On average, each patent
cited 10.34 prior U.S. patents, compared with only 2.44 foreign pat-
ents and 2.37 non-patent references. Indeed, the median patent
cited no non-patent prior art at all.7 The absence of non-patent
prior art is particularly striking given that in many areas of tech-
nology, other patents may not be the best source of prior art.71 The
predominance of U.S. patents may also reflect the limitations of the
PTO systems for searching: the PTO is much more likely to find
documents that it itself has generated. Given that in many fields
the most relevant prior art is non-patent prior art, the predomi-
69. Because only some of the patents used more than one type of priority mechanism, we
cannot merely sum these numbers to determine the number of patents relying on prior U.S.
applications.
70. Further, this data may, if anything, overstate the number of non-patent prior art refer-
ences actually cited, since some apparently non-patent sources may in fact be reported abstracts
of European Patent Office disclosures.
71. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intel-
lectual Property Implications of ' _ock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1177-80 (1995);
see also Greg Ahronian, Legal Resources and Tools for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the
Internet, Bioinformatics, and Electronic Commerce, INTERNET PATENT NEWS SERVICE,
http://www.bustpatents.com (arguing that software patents are of doubtful validity because they
cite very little non-patent prior art).
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nance of patents in the art actually cited by the PTO suggests seri-
ous shortcomings in the PTO's validity investigation.72
Finally, we also investigated the number of claims filed in
each patent. On average, patents in the sample had 14.87 claims.
The median patent had 12 claims, but patents had as few as one
claim and as many as 120. The vast majority of these claims were
dependent; the median patent had only two independent claims,
though some patents had as many as 24. These data are summa-
rized in Table 5.
By itself, the number of claims in a patent does not tell us
much. But it may be a proxy for the size or complexity of an inven-
tion, a possibility we return to below.
B. Relationships Among the Data
We conducted statistical tests on a number of relationships
between the characteristics we have identified.
1. Relationships Between Technology and Country of Origin
We found significant differences between the technologies
patented by inventors in different countries. We tested these rela-
tionships in a number of ways. First, we examined the breakdown
of inventions into the PTO categories of mechanical, chemical, and
electrical for each country with five or more patents. The results
are presented in Table 6.
Some differences are evident from this data. Compared to
the overall numbers-37.4% mechanical, 29.2% chemical, and
33.4% electrical-U.S.-based inventors patent somewhat more me-
chanical inventions, and somewhat fewer electrical inventions.
Other countries patenting more mechanical inventions than aver-
age, and fewer electrical inventions, include Canada, Taiwan, and
the U.K. By contrast, Japan and Korea both patented far more elec-
trical inventions than average, and fewer mechanical and chemical
inventions. When patents from outside the U.S. are aggregated, the
result is that non-U.S. patents were somewhat less likely than U.S.
patents to be mechanical (32.8% outside the U.S., compared with
41.3% within the U.S.) and somewhat more likely to be electrical
(38.9% outside the U.S., compared with 28.7% within). We tested
both of these relationships for statistical significance and deter-
72. While it does not necessarily follow that the PTO should beef up searching and prose-
cution, the reader should be aware of the limitations in the PTO's examination. See Lemley,
Rational Ignorance, supra note 5.
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mined that there is a strong, statistically significant relationship
between PTO subject matter classification and country of origin.7 3
Because, as noted above, the PTO's subject matter classifica-
tions are unreliable, we also tested the relationship between coun-
try of origin and each of the fourteen areas of technology we have
defined for this study. The results are presented in Table 7.
There is clearly a significant variance between countries
with respect to the areas of technology in which they obtain pat-
ents. This can best be seen by comparing the percentages of any
given country for any given technology with the percentage of pat-
ents that involve that technology in the population as a whole.
Thus, the U.K. and Italy have more than their share of pharmaceu-
tical patents; Japan and Korea have more computer-related pat-
ents; Japan, France, and the U.K. have more software patents; Ja-
pan, Korea, and Italy have more semiconductor patents; Canada
has more electronic patents; Germany and France have more
chemistry patents; Taiwan has more mechanical patents; Japan
and Korea have more optical patents; and France has more commu-
nications-related patents. Surprisingly, the U.S. has less than its
share of computer-related, software, semiconductor, and electronics
patents, but is over-represented in the fields of pharmaceuticals,
medical devices, and biotechnology.74 This is demonstrated more
73. We conducted a Chi-square test of homogeneity in both cases, which found significant
differences in PTO subject matter class both between foreign and U.S. patents, and country by
country.
Test Result:
Foreign vs. US:
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 2 12.837 0.002
Country-by country:
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 22 79.595 0.001
On the Chi-square test, see generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS
FOR LAWYERS 159-65 (1990).
74. With respect to biotechnology, our study finds significantly more patents to be of U.S.
origin than Daniel Johnson's work covering prior years. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 23. This
is likely because Johnson's definition of biotechnology is significantly broader than ours, includ-
ing a number of classes that we would describe as either pharmaceutical or chemical, such as
IPC A61K 'Preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes") and IPC G01N ("Investigating
or analyzing materials by determining their chemical or physical properties"). Id.; see also dis-
cussion supra Part III (providing our definition of biotechnology). It appears that U.S.-based
patents were concentrated in these narrower categories.
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clearly in Table 8. These relationships are strong and statistically
significant. 75
Finally, we investigated whether there was any difference in
"crossover" by country. We tested this by asking whether there was
any significant difference in the number of technology areas be-
tween U.S. and foreign patents, and between each country. Our test
found no statistically significant relationship between country of
origin and the number of areas of technology into which any given
patent fell.76
We have not attempted here to read any social significance
into these numbers. It is certainly possible to speculate why some
countries patented disproportionately in the technologies they did.
Are those countries preeminent in those fields? That is one possible
75. We conducted a Chi-square test of homogeneity in both cases, which found significant
differences in areas of technology both between foreign and U.S. patents, and country by country.
Test Result:
Foreign vs. US:
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF ORIGIN BY TECFIELD
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 13 28.251 0.008
Country-by country.
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF COUNTRY BY TECFIELD
Statistic DF Value Prob
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff]
Chi-Square 143 182.774 0.014
76. We used a Poisson linear model with a Chi-square test for significance. We refer to
this approach hereafter as a "Poisson regression." See generally FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra
note 73, at 148-50 (discussing the Poisson regression between two variables).
Test Result:
Foreign vs. US:
LR Statistics For Type 1 Analysis
Source Deviance DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
INTERCEPT 225.6527 0 0.0704
ORIGIN 225.5823 1 0.7908
Country-by country (with U.S. as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
CA 1 0.0002 0.9875
JA 1 2.0446 0.1527
KO 1 0.0204 0.8866
AU 1 0.4783 0.4892
TW 1 2.6534 0.1033
UK 1 0.8047 0.3697
GE 1 1.3873 0.2389
FR 1 0.2159 0.6422
IT 1 0.5467 0.4597
SW 1 0.2865 0.5925
NE 1 0.0908 0.7632
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explanation, though casual inspection suggests some surprises
along those lines. Japan might be thought to excel in semiconduc-
tors and optics, for instance, but its overrepresentation in software
and underrepresentation in electronics are harder to explain.
Similarly, it seems implausible that the U.S. is behind the innova-
tion curve in software, computer-related, and semiconductor inven-
tions.
An alternative explanation might focus on the relative eco-
nomic value of patents in different industries. Here the question is
not so much one of a country's prominence in a particular field as
the economic incentives to file patents abroad. Foreign inventors
might not file applications in the U.S. for inventions they consid-
ered less valuable, or inventions for which the U.S. was unlikely to
be a large market. By contrast, owners of valuable inventions are
more likely to seek worldwide protection, and owners of inventions
in certain fields like software may want protection in the U.S. even
if they do not seek it elsewhere. This may explain why inventors in
other countries disproportionately patent inventions in the phar-
maceutical, semiconductor, computer-related, and software fields. It
is not a full explanation for the differences we observe, however.
For example, U.S. patentees dominate some areas of technology
that seem especially valuable, like biotechnology. The market-based
theory also explains otherwise surprising results about the patents
prosecuted by U.S. inventors. Because U.S. inventors are likely to
file here if they file anywhere, these "less valuable" inventions have
not been filtered out by the decision to file abroad. Thus, the
prevalence of mechanical inventions and medical devices among
U.S. inventors may not say anything at all about the relative
prominence of the U.S. in these fields. It may merely mean that
mechanical inventors are less likely to file worldwide.
2. Relationships Between Technology and the Prosecution Process
We evaluated a number of relationships between areas of
technology and various aspects of the patent prosecution process.
For areas of technology, we again used two different measures, in-
cluding the PTO classifications into mechanical, electrical, and
chemical patents, and our more detailed classification into 14 more
specific areas. However, we have focused our study on the latter,
more detailed system. We then tested those classifications for rela-
tionships to the number of U.S. applications filed, total years the
application spent in the PTO, small versus large entity status, the
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number of inventors, the number and type of references cited, and
number and type of claims filed.
First, we compared the number of U.S. applications filed by a
particular applicant during the prosecution process to the area of
technology. 77 The results are presented in Table 9.
There is a strong relationship between area of technology
and the total number of applications filed before a patent issued.
The mean number of applications fied across all areas of technol-
ogy was 1.50 per patent issued. Patents in the chemistry, pharma-
ceutical, and biotechnology fields were based on many more filings
than were the norm. Indeed, pharmaceutical and biotechnology
patents had on average well over two applications, that is, at least
one refiling, before issuance. By contrast, patents in the electronics,
mechanics, acoustics, automotive, and communications industries
were significantly less likely than average to engage in refilings.
These differences were statistically significant.78
There are at least two likely explanations for this difference.
First, it may be that patent applicants in the chemical, pharmaceu-
tical, and biotechnological fields consider patents more important to
their business than patent applicants in other fields. 79 Thus, these
applicants may have been willing to fight harder with the PTO to
77. We should emphasize that we tested the number of times a particular application was
"refiled" in whole or in part, including continuations, CIPs, and divisional applications. This is
not a test of what percentage of applications actually issue as patents. On that issue, see Cecil
D. Quillen Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S.
Patent Office (unpublished manuscript 2000) (on file with authors).
78. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results.
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
PHARM 1 4.3942 0.0361
MEDDEV 1 1.6177 0.2034
BIOTECH 1 9.6071 0.0019
COMP 1 2.0218 0.1551
SOFTWARE 1 0.0165 0.8979
SEMICOND 1 0.5856 0.4441
ELECTRON 1 0.0202 0.8870
CHEMIST 1 7.7627 0.0053
MECHAN 1 0.2367 0.6266
ACOUST 1 0.9541 0.3287
OPTICS 1 1.8922 0.1690
AUTO 1 1.9188 0.1660
ENERGY 1 0.9790 0.3225
COMMUN 1 0.3090 0.5783
79. Some independent evidence to this effect can be found in two survey studies testing the
importance of patents across industries, beth finding that companies in these fields reported
heavier reliance on patent protection than companies in many other fields. See Cohen et al.,
supra note 17; Levin et al., supra note 14.
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get broad claims issued because they believed there was more at
stake.80 Second, the pace of change in these industries is less than
in some of the other industries we have studied, like software and
semiconductors. Indeed, most pharmaceutical and biotechnological
patents will not be useful until close to the end of their term, be-
cause the inventions covered by those patents must await FDA ap-
proval before they can be sold, and the FDA approval process is
longer than the patent prosecution process in most cases. Thus, the
price of abandonment and refiling-delay in the issuance of a pat-
ent 81 --may hurt those companies less than it would hurt companies
in faster-moving industries.82
Next, we comparedthe time patents spent in prosecution to
the area of technology. This is a highly contested and politically di-
visive issue because of the change in patent term beginning in
1995.83 Since patent terms are generally now measured from the
date of first U.S. filing, spending longer in the PTO reduces the
amount of protection afforded an invention. Thus, industries whose
patents spend longer in prosecution than average may feel unfairly
disadvantaged by the 20-year patent term. 84 The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 10.
These data demonstrate a substantial variance between the
amount of time different types of patents spend in the PTO. On av-
erage, patents across all areas of technology spent 2.77 years in
prosecution. Several classes of inventions did considerably better
than that average, notably mechanical, electronics, and automotive
inventions. 85 On the other hand, patents in the areas of chemistry,
pharmaceuticals, software, and biotechnology took significantly
80. Related to this argument is the theory that the PTO is harder on patent applications in
these fields, necessitating a longer prosecution process that includes more continuation practice.
Cf. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Bio-
technological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998) (making this argument in the
written description context).
81. See generally supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween time in prosecution and the number of filings).
82. Strictly speaking, this argument is true only of that subset of inventions in these cate-
gories that would require approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ('FDA"). None-
theless, that subset may be large enough to influence the numbers for the whole category.
83. See generally Lemley, supra note 8, at 369 (reviewing some of this controversy and dis-
cussing an earlier study of the phenomenon).
84. In response to these criticisms, in 1999 Congress passed the American Invention Pro-
tection Act, which includes a labrynthine series of patent term extensions to compensate inven-
tors for various sorts of delay in the PTO.
85. Note that both the mechanical and electronics inventions are the more limited classes
that we defined, not the broad classes defined by the PTO classification system.
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longer than average to make it through the PTO.8 6 In the case of
both pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, the mean time in prosecu-
tion was well over four years. 87 These results are statistically sig-
nificant. 88
The policy implications of this finding are unclear. On the
one hand, it might seem unfair to give less protection to some types
of technology than to others. Thus, these data might be used to
support an argument for differential protection for certain types of
technology.8 9 On the other hand, to the extent that the longer
prosecution periods are within the control of patent applicants be-
cause they result from voluntary refiling of multiple "continuation"
applications,90 the result seems much less unfair. Further, at least
with respect to pharmaceutical and biotechnology inventions, it
seems likely that patent protection is less important in the early
stages of commercialization, and more important at the end of the
86. This confirms and updates Johnson's conclusions that patents in the biotechnology in-
dustry in particular spent longer in prosecution than other types of patents. See Johnson, supra
note 29, at figs. 8-10.
87. In all three cases, however, the standard deviation was significantly higher than for
other classes, demonstrating greater variance in prosecution times. The higher medians here
are driven in part by extremely long prosecution periods for a few patents-18 years in one case.
88. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
PHARM 1 12.2245 0.0005
MEDDEV 1 6.2988 0.0121
BIOTECH 1 21.5640 0.0001
COMP 1 2.1662 0.1411
SOFTWARE 1 7.8358 0.0051
SEMICOND 1 2.6729 0.1021
ELECTRON 1 6.120 0.2042
CHEMIST 1 16.6183 0.0001
MECHAN 1 0.1658 0.6839
ACOUST 1 0.2909 0.5896
OPTICS 1 0.5685 0.4509
AUTO 1 0.8078 0.3688
ENERGY 1 2.0262 0.1546
COMMUN 1 0.2965 0.5861
The variance from the mean was statistically significant for pharmaceuticals, medical de-
vices, biotechnology, software, and chemical inventions.
89. Some have suggested that the duration of patent protection should vary by industry to
account for different economic factors in different fields. But see Louis Kaplow, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984) (providing skeptical discus-
sion of this idea). The law does in fact permit such variation in the specific context of pharma-
ceuticals. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1994).
90. See generally supra text accompanying notes 83-88 (describing the relationship be-
tween area of technology and the number of applications filed); infra tbl. 9. It is clear from Table
9 that pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, two of the areas with the longest pendency times, also
have a disproportionately high number of refilings.
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patent term. 91 If so, the actual harm to owners of these patents
seems less important. By contrast, the harm to owners of software
patents should be correspondingly greater because of the fast-
changing nature of the software field.
Next, we tested the relationship between area of technology
and the size of the patent owner. To determine size, we used data
on the "small entity status" of the patent owner at the time of
grant.9 2 Thus, we divided each area of technology into patents filed
by "small entities" and "large entities" as the PTO defines them.93
Within the small entity category, we further subdivided patentees
into three PTO categories: individuals, small businesses, and non-
profit organizations. The results of these tests are reproduced in
Table 11.
On average, 29.3% of the patents in our sample were filed by
small entities, and 70.7% by large entities. The small entity num-
bers are a composite of three sub-categories: (1) individuals, who
filed 17.5% of all the patents in the sample; (2) non-profits, which
filed 1.1%; and (3) small businesses, which filed 10.7%. The data in
Table 11 demonstrate a major difference in the size of the patentee
by area of technology. Small entities patented more than half of the
medical devices and mechanical inventions in our sample. By con-
trast, they patented less than 1/3 of every other type of invention,
and in many categories, including computer-related, software,
semiconductors, chemistry, optics, automotive, and energy-related,
small entities obtained less than 20% of the patents in the field.
These results are statistically significant, both between large and
small entities and across the range of each type of entity.94
91. This results from the significant time such inventions normally spend in the FDA ap-
proval process.
92. We are grateful to the PTO for providing us this data for each of the patents in our
sample.
93. See supra note 37.
94. We conducted a Chi-square test of homogeneity between areas of technology and each
category and obtained the following test results:
Small vs. Large
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF ENTITY SIZE BY TECHNOLOGY FIELD
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 13 165.960 0.001
By each category
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF ENTITY STATUS BY TECFIELD
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 39 194.743 0.001
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In some of these fields, the results are not terribly surpris-
ing. Mechanical and medical devices are easier for individuals to
build than semiconductor chips, for example. Many of the areas of
technology dominated by large entities are capital intensive or
dominated by large companies; semiconductors and automotive in-
ventions are two obvious examples. But it is somewhat more sur-
prising that software and computer-related inventions, which gen-
erally are not thought to require a large capital investment, are
nonetheless patented overwhelmingly by large entities. And the
results certainly suggest that the importance of small inventors in
statistical terms depends greatly on the area of technology in ques-
tion.9 5 Since disputes between large and small inventors seem to
drive patent policy of late, it is important to recognize that those
different groups are often patenting different sorts of inventions.
A related issue is the relationship between area of technol-
ogy and the number of inventors listed on any given patent.96 We
found only modest differences between the mean number of inven-
tors in each area of technology. The data are presented in Table 12.
On average, patents in our sample had 2.25 inventors.
Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical inventions had some-
what more inventors on each patent, more than 2.8 each on aver-
age. By contrast, mechanical and acoustical inventions had less
than 1.9 inventors each on average. The median patent in each
class, with the exception of mechanics, had 2 named inventors.
These differences are statistically significant, 97 and they track to
We caution, however, that the test of each category may not be valid for categories with small
sample sizes, notably non-profits.
95. It is conceivable that inventions by individuals or small businesses are somehow more
important in qualitative terms than those made by large entities. We have no data to test such
an hypothesis, and we express no opinion on the question here.
96. It is reasonable to expect that patents acquired by large entities will list more co-
inventors than patents by individuals or small businesses.
97. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
PHARM 1 0.0172 0.8957
MEDDEV 1 5.7306 0.0167
BIOTECH 1 3.1215 0.0773
COMP 1 0.3648 0.5458
SOFTWARE 1 1.6939 0.1931
SEMICOND 1 0.4749 0.4907
ELECTRON 1 0.2155 0.6425
CHEMIST 1 5.3870 0.0203
MECHAN 1 5.6279 0.0177
ACOUST 1 2.6955 0.1006
OPTICS 1 3.6942 0.0546
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some extent the size differentials just noted. Areas of technology
that are mainly the province of large companies also tend to have
more inventors per patent, while areas frequently patented by
small entities are more likely to have single inventors. But the
ranges are roughly the same across all areas of technology, and the
differences between categories are not that great.
We also tested the relationship between areas of technology
and the number and type of prior art references cited in the patent.
Citation of prior art is the best proxy we have in these data for the
quality and thoroughness of a patent examination, so variance in
the prior art cited by area may be indicative of variance in the
quality of the patents that issue. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 13.
There are a number of interesting facts in this data. On av-
erage, patents across all ranges of technology cited 15.16 refer-
ences. The differences between different technology areas, however,
were dramatic. 98 Semiconductor and electronics patents cited many
fewer references than the mean, an average of 9.41 and 11.84 re-
spectively. On the other extreme, medical devices cited 25.84 refer-
ences on average, and biotechnology patents cited a mean of 23.86
references. 99 These differences are also reflected in the median
number of references cited: 8 for semiconductors and 9 for elec-
AUTO 1 0.5717 0.4496
ENERGY 1 4.1933 0.0406
COMMUN 1 0.1105 0.7396
98. These differences are statistically significant. We used a Poisson regression to relate
areas of technology to number of references cited and obtained the following test results:
Total references
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
PHARM 1 0.1179 0.7314
MEDDEV 1 501.1434 0.0001
BIOTECH 1 179.9105 0.0001
COMP 1 5.6777 0.0172
SOFTWARE 1 3.3909 0.0656
SEMICOND 1 23.5891 0.0001
ELECTRON 1 2.5345 0.1114
CHEMIST 1 84.6291 0.0001
MECHAN 1 17.9960 0.0001
ACOUST 1 1.8188 0.1775
OPTICS 1 28.2701 0.0001
AUTO 1 70.1559 0.0001
ENERGY 1 33.4952 0.0001
COMMJUN 1 8.7345 0.0031
99. Again, despite definitional differences, our findings regarding biotechnology are consis-
tent with Johnson's findings for earlier time periods that biotechnology patents cite significantly
more references than other sorts of patents. Johnson, supra note 29, at fig. 12.
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tronics patents, compared with 15 for medical devices and 17 for
biotechnology. Finally, it is interesting to note that at least some
patents in the electronics and mechanical fields cited no prior art
references whatsoever.
There were also significant differences in the citation pat-
terns for different types of prior art. Citation of U.S. patents as
prior art references ranged from an average low of 4.59 for biotech-
nology patents and 6.06 for pharmaceutical patents, to a high of
19.44 for medical device patents. 100 By contrast, the citation pat-
terns are totally different for foreign patent references. There, soft-
ware and semiconductor inventions cite the fewest foreign patents,
1.26 and 1.57 on average respectively, while chemistry and automo-
tive patents cite the most foreign patents, 3.63 and 3.83 respec-
tively. In many areas, including computer-related patents, soft-
ware, electronics, and acoustics, the median patent did not cite any
foreign patent references.
Finally, the variance was most dramatic in the non-patent
references cited in each area of technology. Biotechnology and
pharmaceutical patents cited the most non-patent art, citing 16.30
and 9.88 references respectively on average. The median biotech-
nology patent cited 15 non-patent references, and the median
pharmaceutical patent cited 5 such references. On the other hand,
in many areas of technology patentees cited little or no non-patent
prior art. For example, the median patent cited no non-patent prior
art in each of the following fields: medical devices, computer-
related, semiconductor, electronics, mechanics, acoustics, optics,
automotive, energy, and communications. Put another way, in only
four of the 14 areas of technology did more than half of the patents
cite any non-patent art whatsoever.
Interestingly, despite vocal criticism from some quarters, 10 1
the software industry actually cited relatively more non-patent
prior art than in most other areas of technology. While we think
this is an encouraging sign, it does not necessarily mean that the
PTO is doing a good job of finding the relevant prior art in the soft-
ware field. Many commentators have suggested that virtually all
100. These differences were also reflected in the median numbers: the median biotechnology
patent cited 2 U.S. patent references, the median pharmaceutical patent cited 3 U.S. patent
references, while the median medical device patent cited 12 U.S. patent references. See infra
tbl. 13.
101. See Ahronian, supra note 71.
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the relevant art in the software industry is non-patent art. 10 2 If so,
the fact that most prior art cited in software patents still consists of
other patents may mean that the PTO isn't citing nearly enough
non-patent prior art in this field.
Finally, we tested the relationship between the number and
type of claims filed and the area of technology. The number of
claims filed is directly related to the cost of prosecution, and can
serve as a proxy for either the complexity of the subject matter or
for the importance of the patent to the applicant. The results are
presented in Table 14.
The average number of claims across all areas of technology
is 14.87 total claims, 2.75 of which are independent claims and
12.12 of which are dependent claims. The data show some variance
in total claims, from a low of 13.30 on average for biotechnology
patents to a high of 18.64 for acoustics patents; the median varies
from a low of 9 for biotechnology to a high of 17 for acoustics. The
total variance is not particularly great, however. 103 Thus, either the
number of claims is not a good predictor of importance or complex-
ity, or there is no substantial variance in complexity between dif-
ferent areas of technology10 4 The pattern is similar for both inde-
pendent and dependent claims.
102. See, e.g., MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SoFrWARE AND INTERNET LAW 333-34 (2000); Cohen,
supra note 71, at 1177-80; Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
103. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
Total claims
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
PHARM 1 1.2274 0.2679
MEDDEV 1 40.8937 0.0001
BIOTECH 1 8.0129 0.0046
COMP 1 1.1876 0.2758
SOFTWARE 1 10.5704 0.0011
SEMICOND 1 0.0726 0.7875
ELECTRON 1 0.3770 0.5392
CHEMIST 1 0.7676 0.3810
MECHAN 1 18.1854 0.0001
ACOUST 1 9.5832 0.0020
OPTICS 1 1.3676 0.2422
AUTO 1 4.9334 0.0263
ENERGY 1 1.6981 0.1925
COMMUN 1 1.0130 0.3142
104. We are intuitively inclined to credit the former explanation.
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3. Relationships Between Country of Origin and the Prosecution
Process
In Section 2, we related area of technology to a number of
specific facts about the prosecution process. In this Section, we test
the relationship between the same prosecution process metrics and
the invention's country of origin. Thus, we test the relationship be-
tween country of origin and the following factors: number of appli-
cations filed, time spent in prosecution, small entity status, number
of inventors, number and type of references cited, and number and
type of claims fied.
First, we tested the relationship between country of origin
and the total number of U.S. applications filed leading up to the
issuance of each patent. As noted above, abandoning and refiling
applications is a legal but controversial process because it has been
associated with so-called "submarine patents."10 5 Here we evaluate
whether use of this practice differs by nationality. We tested two
sets of data: U.S. versus foreign patents and a country-by-country
analysis for each of the 12 countries with five or more patents in
the sample. The results are presented in Table 15.
The data show substantial variance by country in the use of
the abandonment and refiling procedure. 06 While only a minority of
105. See, e.g., Steve Blount & Louis Zarfas, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Subma-
rine Patents and Amend Around a Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC Y 11 (1999); Timothy R. DeWitt, Does Supreme Court Precedent Sink Sub-
marine Patents?, 38 IDEA 601 (1998); Lemley, supra note 30, at 369; David L. Marcus, Is the
Submarine Patent Torpedoed? Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson and the Revival of Continuation
Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521 (1997); James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan,
Silent Enemies, RECORDER, May 4, 1994, at 10.
106. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
Foreign vs. US
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ORIGIN 1 8.3247 0.0039
Country vs. country (with the U.S. as the baseline)
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
CA 1 0.0022 0.9623
JA 1 1.1335 0.2870
KO 1 1.6763 0.1954
AU 1 0.7799 0.3772
TW 1 6.0600 0.0138
UK 1 0.0684 0.7937
GE 1 8.1832 0.0042
FR 1 0.1406 0.7077
IT 1 0.3964 0.5289
SW 1 2.0712 0.1501
NE 1 0.5658 0.4519
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patentees in every country tested used this procedure, the U.S. had
more abandonments and refilings on average than any other coun-
try represented in the sample. Other countries with refiling rates
nearly as high include Canada, Japan, the U.K., and France. By
contrast, other countries had significantly lower refiling rates. In-
deed, two countries, Taiwan and Switzerland, never engaged in re-
filing in the sampled patents.
Next, we related country of origin to the time spent in prose-
cution. As with other tests in this Section, we tested both U.S. ver-
sus foreign patents and country-by-country results. The results are
presented in Table 16.
The results are quite interesting. U.S. patents spent signifi-
cantly longer in prosecution than foreign patents: 2.92 years for
U.S. patents, compared with 2.60 years for foreign patents. The
variance among individual countries is even greater, ranging from a
low of 1.32 years on average for Taiwanese patents to a high of 3.57
years for Australian patents. 10 7 This result may seem at first glance
107. These results are statistically significant for Foreign vs. U.S. We used a Gamma re-
gression because one of the variables is continuous rather than discrete. Gamma regression is
simply one of many forms of Generalized Linear Model; Poisson regression is another. Although
Gamma is not the only method that could have been used. for this test, we determined with our
statistician that Gamma was a better fit for this subset of data because it provides an additional
constraint to ensure that all of the data remain positive numbers.
The terms Poisson regression and Gamma regression are shorthand phrases for particular
types of Generalized Linear Models. One builds the model and then uses regression (here, logis-
tic regression) to produce a result. See JAMES K LINDSEY, APPLYING GENERALIZED LINEAR
MODELS 18-25, 132-33 (George Casella et al. eds., 1997); PETER MCCULLAGH & JOHN A. NELDER,
GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS 287-322 (2d ed. 1989).
Test Result:
Foreign vs. US
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ORIGIN 1 11.8374 0.0006
Country-by-country (with the U.S. as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
CA 1 0.0222 0.8816
JA 1 1.9377 0.1639
KO 1 4.8013 0.0284
AU 1 0.9258 0.3360
TW 1 41.3841 0.0001
UK 1 2.2880 0.1304
GE 1 8.5161 0.0035
FR 1 1.0154 0.3136
IT 1 0.2705 0.6030
SW 1 5.5456 0.0185
NE 1 1.5527 0.2127
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to support the complaints of those who allege that the patent sys-
tem is somehow stacked against U.S. inventors. We encourage cau-
tion in attempting to explain these results, however. As noted in
the previous Section, time spent in prosecution may be dependent
on other factors like the total number of applications filed. Thus,
the fact that U.S. inventors refied patent applications more often
than any other country likely contributes to its high time in prose-
cution, and Taiwanese reluctance to engage in this practice may
explain their quicker prosecution times. Further, because different
countries obtain patents in different areas of technology, the na-
tional variance may be related to the variance by area of technology
observed earlier.108 Thus, the fact that the U.S. has disproportion-
ately more biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents, coupled with
the fact that those patents tend to spend longer in prosecution, may
help to explain why U.S. patents spend longer in prosecution on
average. Again, however, settling on an explanation is not possible
from this data alone.
Next, we examined how small entity status varied by nation-
ality. The data are presented in Table 17. The results are striking.
There is tremendous variance by country in whether small entities
obtain a significant portion of the patents in the sample. 10 9 U.S.
patentees are more likely than foreign patentees to be small enti-
ties. Similarly, patentees in Taiwan, Australia, Switzerland, and
Canada are more likely than average to be small entities while pat-
entees in Japan, Korea, Germany, and France are unlikely to be
However, the results of the country-by-country analysis are less certain, because with some
countries, the size of the sample was so small. Thus Australia, the outlier in this test, had only
six patents in the sample, and this may reduce the predictive power of the results for that coun-
try. Indeed, the median patent for Australia spent less than two years in prosecution, well below
the median for many other countries with lower means.
108. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
109. The results are statistically significant, though the country-by-country results must be
interpreted with caution. We used a Chi-square test of homogeneity and obtained the following
test results:
Foreign vs. US
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF ORIGIN BY ENTITY SIZE
Statistic F Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 3 71.664 0.001
Country-by-country
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF COUNTRY BY ENTITY SIZE
Statistic DF Value Prob
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Chi-Square 33 227.327 0.001
Again, however, the small sample size renders the statistical significance of this second test
suspect.
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small entities. What is even more notable is the magnitude of the
differences. Compare the two largest patentees, the U.S. and Japan:
40.19% of U.S. patents in the sample were obtained by small enti-
ties, compared with only 3.3% of Japanese patents.
This data might reflect cultural differences in innovation be-
tween the countries. For example, one could construct an argument
that the U.S. economic climate is more hospitable than Japan to
start-ups and independent inventors. However, we suspect a large
part of the effect is attributable to the high cost of worldwide patent
protection. Small entities presumably have less money to spend on
patent prosecution. They may therefore be more likely to prosecute
patents in their home country but not abroad than large entities
with overseas sales and large prosecution budgets. If so, the large
number of U.S.-based small entities may simply be an artifact of
where the study was done. n0
Next, we related nationality of origin to the number of inven-
tors on each patent. The results are presented in Table 18.
The results generally do not show major differences by coun-
try. While there is variance within each country, especially for
countries like Australia with small sample sizes, the variance by
country is not statistically significant."' There is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the number of inventors on U.S. and
foreign patents, though it is fairly modest. U.S. patents have 2.14
110. An empirical test of this proposition could be conducted by measuring similar "small
entity" filings in other countries, if the data could be found.
111. We used a Poisson regression. The difference between U.S. and foreign patents as a
whole was statistically significant, but the country-by-country data was not.
Test Result:
Foreign vs. US
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ORIGIN 1 6.3635 0.0116
Country-by-country (with the U.S. as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Squaie Pr>Chi
CA 1 3.9426 0.0471
JA 1 23.2583 0.0001
KO 1 5.5550 0.0184
AU 1 4.5400 0.0331
TW 1 6.4926 0.0108
UK 1 0.1178 0.7314
GE 1 2.5769 0.1084
FR 1 1.4912 0.2220
IT 1 0.0275 0.8683
SW 1 0.0401 0.8413
NE 1 0.0026 0.9591
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inventors on average, and foreign patents have 2.38 on average.
Both, however, have a median of two inventors and a maximum of
10 or 11 inventors.
One exception to the general homogeneity of inventorship
involves Japan. Japan has significantly more inventors per patent
than any other country. One might look to cultural factors such as a
tradition of collaboration or sharing of credit to explain this
result.112 Alternatively, it is worth noting that Japan had the lowest
percentage of small entity patent owners, and that entity size is
strongly correlated with the number of inventors per patent.113
We tested the relationship between country of origin and the
number and type of prior art references cited. The results are pre-
sented in Tables 19 and 20.
There are a number of interesting relationships among these
data. U.S. patents included significantly more prior art references
than their foreign counterparts, both on average, with 19.29 per
U.S. patent compared to 10.31 per foreign patent, and at the me-
dian, with 13 in the median U.S. patent compared to 9 in the me-
dian foreign patent. As might be expected, the breakdown of this
prior art reflects national origin to some extent; foreign patentees
are more likely to cite foreign patents as prior art, and much less
likely to cite U.S. patents. This last fact gives us some inferential
evidence that much of the prior art cited in patents is, in fact, art
submitted by the applicant, not art found by the examiner. Appli-
cants are more likely to have access to art from their home country;
there is no reason to believe examiners would be more likely to find
art from the applicant's home country.
To the extent that citation of a great deal of prior art is evi-
dence of a more rigorous prosecution process, something the last
paragraph calls into question, it appears that U.S. patents were
subject to somewhat more searching inquiry than foreign patents.
Again, however, we urge caution in interpreting this data. There is
likely a connection between the sorts of technology patented in the
U.S. and the prior art citation counts. Because the U.S. is dispro-
portionately represented in pharmaceutical and biotechnological
inventions, and because those inventions cite more prior art than
average, it makes sense that U.S. inventions cite more art than
their foreign counterparts.
112. It is worth noting, however, that this supposed cultural characteristic does not hold
true for the other Asian countries in the sample, Taiwan and Korea, which had significantly
fewer inventors per patent than average.
113. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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Finally, we investigated the relationship between nationality
of origin and the number and type of claims in each of the patents.
The results are presented in Tables 21 and 22.
U.S. patents had more claims on average than foreign pat-
ents. This is true for both independent and dependent claims, but
the difference is more pronounced for the latter. The U.S. had an
average of 16.78 total claims, and the median U.S. patent had 14
claims. By contrast, foreign patents had an average of 12.64 claims,
and the median foreign patent had only 10 claims. Further, at least
one U.S. patent had as many as 120 claims, more than twice the
maximum number of claims in a foreign patent.
The differences also carry over to a country-by-country
analysis. The U.S. had more claims on average than any other
country, though both Canada and the Netherlands were close, and
the median Dutch patent had even more claims than the median
U.S. patent. The variance among other countries is not terribly
striking, with one exception. Taiwanese patents had far fewer
claims than patents from any other country. The differences be-
tween U.S. and foreign patents, and between each country, are sta-
tistically significant." 4
114. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
Total Claims-
US vs. Foreign
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ORIGIN 1 290.7071 0.0001
Country-by-country (with the U.S. as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
CA 1 0.2496 0.6173
JA 1 158.5613 0.0001
KO 1 65.9956 0.0001
AU 1 0.3339 0.5634
TW 1 325.8377 0.0001
UK 1 7.4042 0.0065
GE 1 82.1215 0.0001
FR 1 11.5788 0.0007
IT 1 6.6363 0.0100
SW 1 3.8946 0.0484
NE 1 0.4501 0.5023
Independent Claims-
US vs. Foreign
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ORIGIN 1 17.7774 0.0001
Country-by-country (with the U.S. as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
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To the extent that one can view claims as a proxy for the
complexity of a patent application, a supposition we are skeptical
of, these data would seem to suggest that U.S. patents were on av-
erage somewhat more complex than their foreign counterparts.
4. Relationships Among Prosecution Factors
Finally, we tested a number of relationships among what we
refer to as "prosecution-related factors": evidence about the prose-
cution process itself, rather than the nationality of the patentee or
the area of technology. In this Section, we describe relationships
among the number of U.S. applications filed, the time spent in
prosecution, small entity status, the number of inventors, the num-
ber and type of prior art references cited, and the number and type
of claims filed.
Source DF
CA 1
JA 1
KO 1
AU 1
TW 1
UK 1
GE 1
FR 1
IT 1
SW 1
NE 1
Dependent Claims-
US vs. Foreign
LP Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF
ORIGIN 1
Country-by-country (with the U.S.
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF
CA 1
JA 1
KO 1
AU 1
TW 1
UK 1
GE 1
FR 1
IT 1
SW 1
NE 1
Chi-Square
1.0752
0.0407
0.0488
2.5968
30.9719
3.8074
20.5631
5.8329
2.4833
8.3696
2.1704
Chi-Square
285.4291
as the baseline):
Chi-Square
0.0065
194.5164
81.0531
2.1390
303.4983
4.4315
62.8443
6.9883
4.4682
0.8650
0.0067
Pr>Chi
0.2998
0.8400
0.8252
0.1071
0.0001
0.0510
0.0001
0.0157
0.1151
0.0038
0.1407
Pr>Chi
0.0001
Pr>Chi
0.9357
0.0001
0.0001
0.1436
0.0001
0.0353
0.0001
0.0082
0.0345
0.3523
0.9349
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a. Relationships Based on Number of Applications Filed
First, we tested the relationship between small entity status
and the number of applications filed. The results are presented in
Table 23.
We found no significant relationship between entity size and
the number of applications filed.115 Thus, it does not appear that
either large companies or small entities are more likely to abandon
and refile their patents. This may have some implications for the
ongoing dispute over "submarine patenting" and other efforts to
take advantage of the patent system.
We also conducted statistical tests of the relationship be-
tween the total number of applications filed and the time spent in
prosecution, as well as the relationship between the total number of
applications filed and the number of prior art references cited. We
found a significant relationship in both cases; refiling more times
increased the time spent in prosecution 1 6 and increased the num-
ber of references of all types cited in the patent.117 Because these
115. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 0.5651 0.4522
By each category within small entities (with individual as the baseline)
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 0.1527 0.6960
SBIZ 1 0.4854 0.4860
LBIZ 1 0.0953 0.7576
116. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
YPTO 1 295.3397 0.0001
117. Using a Poisson regression, we obtained the following test results:
Total references
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
TOTREF 1 52.3760 0.0001
US references
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
USPREF 1 30.2539 0.0001
Foreign references
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
FORPREF 1 19.8184 0.0001
Non references
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
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tests compare two continuous variables, we have not represented
the data in a table.
Related to the test of total applications filed against time
spent in prosecution is the question of how individual types of re-
filings affect time spent in prosecution. We divided patents into dif-
ferent categories depending on whether they filed a continuing ap-
plication or a CIP, a divisional, or no prior U.S. filing at all. We also
tested the effects of claiming foreign priority on U.S. prosecution
time. The results are presented in Table 24.
These results are not very surprising. There was a strong
relationship between refilings of all types and the length of time an
application spent in prosecution. Patents that issued based on the
instant application spent less than two years in prosecution on av-
erage, and the median patent in this group spent only 1.84 years in
prosecution. 118 By contrast, patents with at least one U.S. refiling of
any sort, continuation, CIP, or divisional, spent around five years
on average in the prosecution process. The maximum time, at 18.15
years, was also much longer than for patents without any history of
refiling. It is worth noting, however, that the patent in question
was abandoned and refiled several times during that period. 119
Thus, time spent in prosecution seems to be a function of how many
times the applicant goes back to the patent office with new argu-
ments or amendments. This shouldn't surprise anyone. But it does
suggest that at least some of the delay in prosecution is within the
control of the patent applicant. Since Congress has just acted to try
to limit delay caused by the PTO, 120 it seems important to note that
the PTO is by no means the only source of delay in prosecution.
A curious result concerns patents claiming foreign priority.
Foreign priority under the Paris Convention or the PCT is not
counted against the new 20-year term, and we have not included
the foreign filing date in our calculations of "time spent in prosecu-
tion." Nonetheless, patents claiming foreign priority (largely but
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPREF 1 26.7643 0.0001
118. There were, however, some cases of significant delay in prosecution, even in this group.
One patent application spent 7.88 years in prosecution, without being abandoned and refied. In
the future, the American Inventors Protection Act win provide term extensions in many such
cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1994).
119. The period we studied included patent applications filed both before and after June 8,
1995, when the change in patent term took effect. Applications in our sample first filed before
that date get the benefit of the longer of 17 years from issue or 20 years from filing. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994). Thus, those patents in this sample with long prosecution histories will
not lose protection as a result of the time spent in prosecution.
120. See id. § 154(b).
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not exclusively patents owned by foreign entities), 121 spent signifi-
cantly longer in prosecution than patents that did not claim any
priority to any application. This does not, however, mean that for-
eign patents spent longer in prosecution. 122 Because some foreign
priority patents also included abandonments and refilings in the
U.S. prosecution process, they naturally spent longer in prosecution
than the subset of U.S. patents that issued based on the instant
application. Rather, the relevant comparison is between all patents
with foreign priority and all patents in general. When we make this
comparison directly, patents with foreign filing priority actually
spend somewhat less time in prosecution in the U.S., with 2.66
years on average, than patents overall, with 2.77 years on
average.123
b. Relationships Based on Time in Prosecution
We tested a number of relationships between the time an
application spent in prosecution and other aspects of the prosecu-
tion process, including small entity status, the number and type of
prior art references cited, and the number and type of claims
filed.124
First, we tested the relationship between time in prosecution
and small entity status, including both the fact of small entity
status and the nature of that status, whether individual, non-profit,
or small business. The results are reported in Table 25.
The data reject the supposition advanced by some 125 that the
PTO process is stacked against individuals and small entities, at
least where time spent in prosecution is concerned. Instead, the
evidence suggests that large entities spend more time in prosecu-
tion, with 2.83 years on average and a median of 2.28 years, than
small entities, with 2.62 years on average and a median of 2.13
years. Individuals and small businesses fare somewhat better than
small entities as a whole; non-profit organizations fare worse. In-
121. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
122. In fact, when we tested this relationship directly, the opposite was true: foreign patents
issued more quickly than U.S. patents. See infra tbl. 24.
123. The median patent in both groups is virtually identical, however: 2.23 years for foreign
priority patents and 2.22 years for all patents.
124. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text for a report of the relationship between
time spent in prosecution and the number of applications filed.
125. See, e.g., Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263 (1995); Len S. Smith, Promoting the Progress of Science and America's
Small Entity Inventors, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 585 (1999).
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deed, the median patent to an individual issued in less than two
years. These differences by entity size are statistically significant-
size matters.126
This difference cannot be explained by a greater tendency to
abandon and refile; as noted above, large entities are no more likely
to engage in continuation practice than small entities. It might be
explained by differences in the nature or complexity of the technol-
ogy patented by small and large entities.
c. Relationships Based on Entity Size
Finally, we tested a number of relationships between small
entity status and other variables in the prosecution process, in-
cluding number of inventors, number and type of prior art refer-
ences, and number and type of claims.
First, we tested the relationship between small entity status
and the number of inventors listed on the patent. The results are
reproduced in Table 26.
As one might expect, there is a strong positive relationship
between the size of the entity that owns the patent and the number
of inventors listed on the patent. Large entities list 2.50 inventors
on average, and the median large entity patent has two named in-
ventors. By contrast, small entity patents have only 1.67 inventors
on average, and the median small inventor patent has only one in-
ventor listed. Further, within the small entity category, patents
owned by individuals have fewer named inventors, with 1.47 on av-
erage, than patents owned by small businesses, with 1.89 on aver-
age. 127
126. Using a Gamma regression, we obtained the following test results:
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 4.3483 0.0370
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 4.4025 0.0359
SBIZ 1 0.0964 0.7561
LBIZ 1 3.5224 0.0605
127. Contrary to what one might think, the fact that a patent is not assigned to a corpora-
tion (listed here as "Individuar) does not necessarily mean that there is only one inventor. In
some cases, individuals collaborate on an invention and own the resulting patent as joint inven-
tors, or assign rights in the patent to one of the named inventors rather than to a corporate en-
tity.
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Next, we tested the relationship between entity size and the
number and type of prior irt references cited. The results are re-
printed in Table 27.
The results are significant and somewhat surprising. 128 De-
spite their greater resources, on average, large entities cite less
prior art than small entities, with 14.31 total references compared
128. We used a Poisson regression and obtained the following test result:
Total references-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 112.1334 0.0001
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 54.6478 0.0001
SBIZ 1 13.9674 0.0002
LBIZ 1 31.2177 0.0001
US patent references-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 53.9645 0.0001
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 6.0966 0.0135
SBIZ 1 14.1493 0.0002
LBIZ 1 159.0887 0.0001
Foreign patent references-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 75.1942 0.0001
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 5.1729 0.0229
SBIZ 1 10.3400 0.0013
LBIZ 1 72.6740 0.0001
Non-patent references-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 81.9384 0.0001
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 401.7654 0.0001
SBIZ 1 215.8163 0.0001
LBIZ 1 27.7535 0.0001
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to 17.21.129 This result carries over to U.S. patent references and to
non-patent prior art: in both cases, small entities are likely to cite
more such art than large entities. Since large entities presumably
have greater resources to devote to prosecution, one might expect
them to find and disclose more prior art to the PTO. In fact, the op-
posite seems to be the case. One possible explanation is that large
entities tend to have more sophisticated patent counsel than small
entities, and that those sophisticated lawyers advise their clients
not to do a prior art search. If true, this explanation is somewhat
troubling. While there is no requirement in the law that a patent
applicant search for prior art, this theory suggests that the no-
search rule is benefiting those who could most easily afford a
search, while smaller entities are taking disclosure more seriously.
By contrast, large entities are likely to cite significantly
more foreign patent references than small entities, with 2.71 for-
eign patent references cited by large entities on average, compared
with 1.80 for small entities. This difference could reflect the larger
resources for a search available to large entities, but if so, it is hard
to explain the result for U.S. patents and non-patent references. A
more probable explanation is that a large entity is more likely to
file its application in multiple countries and therefore have more
foreign prior art cited against it by foreign examiners. 130
Finally, we tested the relationship between small entity
status and the number and type of claims in the patent. The results
are presented in Table 28.
The results do not show major differences in the number and
type of claims between small and large entities. There are greater
differences within each category of small entities: individuals file
fewer claims of each type than any other entity, and non-profits file
the most claims. 131 Most, but not all, of the differences are statisti-
cally significant. 132
129. Because "cited prior art, is a combination of prior art cited by the applicant and art
found by the patent office, the art in question was not necessarily cited by the applicant rather
than the examiner. However, we have no a priori reason to believe that examiners are likely to
cite more art against small entities than against large entities, or that they would even know the
difference. The differences are more likely to result either from the area of technology at issue,
or from the art provided by the applicant.
130. Companies that have prior art cited against them by a foreign patent office generally
have an obligation to disclose that prior art to the U.S. PTO in prosecuting the U.S. companion
application. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
131. The conclusion with respect to non-profits is suspect, however; only 11 of the 1,000 pat-
ents in the sample were filed by non-profits.
132. We used a Poisson regression and obtained the following test results:
Total claims-
Small vs. Large
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V. CONCLUSIONS
There is a wealth of interesting results in this data, and we
outlined some of the more interesting findings in the Introduction.
One overarching fact about modern patents stands out to us, how-
ever. The U.S. patent prosecution system is not unitary. Rather,
different entities experience very different sorts of patent prosecu-
tion. For example, chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnological
patents spend much longer in prosecution than other types of pat-
ents. Chemical, medical, and biotechnological patents cite much
more prior art than other patents, and are abandoned and refiled
much more frequently. Similarly, individual inventors experience a
prosecution process that is different in some respects than large
companies, and foreign applicants have a different experience in
prosecution than domestic applicants.
These differences suggest that it is unwise to think of prose-
cution as a whole when setting patent policy. Objections and pro-
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 14.0773 0.0002
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 186.1558 0.0001
SBIZ 1 74.3813 0.0001
LBIZ 1 14.1936 0.0002
Independent claims-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 0.6590 0.4169
By each category (with individual as the baseline)
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 5.9076 0.0151
SBIZ 1 30.9016 0.0001
LBIZ 1 16.6640 0.0001
Dependent claims-
Small vs. Large
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
ENTISIZE 1 20.6063 0.0001
By each category (with individual as the baseline):
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis
Source DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi
NPROFIT 1 188.6882 0.0001
SBIZ 1 47.9340 0.0001
LBIZ 1 5.0115 0.0252
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posals for reform that are tailored to the needs of one industry may
not fit another well at all. Thus, those who would make generaliza-
tions about patent prosecution should take care to ensure that they
do not merely project the experience of one type of client or industry
onto the prosecution process as a whole.
We hope that this information will be useful to practitioners,
courts, and policy-makers, all of whom need a firm grounding in
how the patent system actually works before they can endeavor to
use or change it.
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VI. APPENDIX
Table 1
Technology Areas Sorted by Frequency
Mechanics 329
Computer-Related 242
Chemistry 207
Optics 128
Semiconductors 93
Pharmaceuticals 78
Electronics 77
Software 76
Automobile-Related 72
Medical Devices 64
Communications-Related 41
Biotechnology 37
Energy-Related 24
Acoustics 22
Table 2
Patents Granted By Country of Origin
United States 540
Japan 212
Germany 66
France 31
South Korea 25
Taiwan 24
United Kingdom 19
Canada 17
Italy 13
Netherlands 12
Switzerland 8
Australia 6
21492000]
Table 4
Prior Art References
Table 5
Number and Type of Claims
Claims Independent Dependent Total
Mean 2.75 12.12 14.87
Median 2 10 12
Min 1 0 1
Max 24 115 - 120 j
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Table 3
Patents By Region
North America 33  557
Pacific Rim 134  271
Europe13 5  167
TOTAL 995
Prior Art U.S. Patent Foreign Non-Patent Total Refs
Refs Patent Refs Refs
Mean 10.34 2.44 2.37 15.16
Median 7 1 0 10
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 137 43 68 163
133. Includes the U.S. and Canada.
134. Includes Japan, Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
135. Includes the U.K., Ireland, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic.
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Table 6
Technology Divisions by Country of Origin
13 6
US CA JA KO AU TW
Mech 223 10 45 7 3 17
Chem 162 4 55 3 1 2
Elec 155 3 112 15 2 5
Total 540 17 1 212 25 6 24
UK GE FR IT SW NE TOTAL
Mech 8 26 10 5 5 5 364
Chem 7 26 11 4 1 2 278
Elec 4 14 10 4 2 5 331
Total 19 66 31 13 8 12 973
% US CA JA KO AU TW
Mech 41.30% 58.82% 21.23% 28.00% 50.00% 70.83%
Chem 30.00% 23.53% 25.94% 12.00% 16.67% 8.33%
Elec 28.70% 17.65% 52.83% 60.00% 33.33% 20.83%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
% UK GE FR IT SW NE
Mech 42.11% 39.39% 32.26% 38.46% 62.50% 41.67%
Chem 36.84% 39.39% 35.48% 30.77% 12.50% 16.67%
Elec 21.05% 21.21% 32.26% 30.77% 25.00% 41.67%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% .100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
136 For convenience, we have used two-letter country-code abbreviations in the tables in
this paper. Those abbreviations are: US=United States; CA=Canada; JA=Japan; KO=Korea;
AU=Australia; TW=Taiwan; UK=United Kingdom; GE=Germany; FR=France; IT=Italy;
SW=Switzerland; NE=Netherlands. The totals in the last column do not total 1000 because we
omitted from Table 6 countries that had fewer than five U.S. patents in our sample.
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Table 7
Areas of Technology by Country of Origin
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
US 48 48 31 121 40 46 35
CA 2 0 0 3 1 0 3
JA 7 5 3 83 23 31 21
KO 0 1 0 9 1 6 2
AU 2 0 0 1 1 0 1
TW 0 0 0 2 1 1 2
UK 4 1 1 3 2 0 2
GE 3 1 0 10 1 2 7
FR 3 4 1 4 4 1 2
IT 2 0 1 2 0 2 1
SW 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
NE 1 1 0 2 2 1 0
Total (with 72 62 37 240 76 90 76
5+ patents)
Total (All) 78 64 37 242 76 93 77
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm- Total
Rel Rel Rel
US 105 194 11 51 31 14 25 800
CA 4 7 0 3 1 1 0 25
JA 40 31 7 53 24 4 11 343
KO 1 7 1 6 1 0 1 36
AU 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 11
TW 2 17 0 1 0 0 0 26
UK 5 8 1 3 2 1 0 33
GE 20 27 1 3 9 0 1 85
FR 11 11 1 0 2 2 3 49
IT 3 4 0 1 0 0 0 16
SW 1 6 0 1 1 0 0 10
NE 4 4 0 4 0 0 0 19
Total 198 318 22 127 72 22 41 1453
(with 5+
patents)
Total 207 329 22 128 72 24 41 1490
(All)
% Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec Chem
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
US 61.54% 75.00%183.78% 50.00% 52.63% 49.46% 45.45% 50.72%
CA 2.56% 0.00% 0.00% 1.24% 1.32% 0.00% 3.90% 1.93%
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JA 8.97% 7.81% 8.11% 34.30% 30.26% 33.33% 27.27% 19.32%
KO 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 3.72% 1.32% 6.45% 2.60% 0.48%
AU 2.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.41% 1.32% 0.00% 1.30% 0.97%
TW 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.83% 1.32% 1.08% 2.60% 0.97%
UK 5.13% 1.56% 2.70% 1.24% 2.63% 0.00% 2.60% 2.42%
GE 3.85% 1.56% 0.00% 4.13% 1.32% 2.15% 9.09% 9.66%
FR 3.85% 6.25% 2.70% 1.65% 5.26% 1.08% 2.60% 5.31%
IT 2.56% 0.00% 2.70% 0.83% 0.00% 2.15% 1.30% 1.45%
SW 0.00% 1.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.48%
NE 1.28% 1.56% 0.00% 0.83% 2.63% 1.08% 0.00% 1.93%
Total 92.31% 96.88% 100.00% 99.17% 100.00% 96.77% 98.70% 95.65%
(with 5+
patents)
% Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm- % Total
Rel Rel Rel Pats
US 58.97% 50.00% 39.84% 43.06% 58.33% 60.98% 54.0%
CA 2.13% 0.00% 2.34% 1.39% 4.17% 0.00% 1.7%
JA 9.42% 31.82% 41.41% 33.33% 16.67% 26.83% 21.2
KO 2.13% 4.55% 4.69% 1.39% 0.00% 2.44% 2.5%
AU 0.61% 0.00% 0.78% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.6%
TW 5.17% 0.00% 0.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.4%
UK 2.43% 4.55% 2.34% 2.78% 4.17% 0.00% 1.9%
GE 8.21% 4.55% 2.34% 12.50% 0.00% 2.44% 6.6%
FR 3.34% 4.55% 0.00% 2.78% 8.33% 7.32% 3.1%
IT 1.22% 0.00% 0.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.3%
SW 1.82% 0.00% 0.78% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.8%
NE 1.22% 0.00% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.2%
100.00% 99.22% 100.00% 91.67% 1100.00%
2152
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Table 8
Areas of Technology by U.S. Origin
US non-US Total
origin I
Pharm 48 30 78
Med Dev 48 16 64
BioTech 31 6 37
Comp-Rel 121 121 242
Software 40 36 76
SemiCond 46 47 93
Elec 35 42 77
Chem 105 102 207
Mech 194 135 329
Acoustics 11 11 22
Optics 51 77 128
Auto-Rel 31 41 72
Ener-Rel 14 10 24
Comm-Rel 25 16 41
Total 800 690 1490
% US non-US Total
origin
Pharm 61.54% 38.46% 100.00%
Med Dev 75.00% 25.00% 100.00%
BioTech 83.78% 16.22% 100.00%
Comp-Rel 50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Software 52.63% 47.37% 100.00%
SemiCond 49.46% 50.54% 100.00%
Elec 45.45% 54.55% 100.00%
Chem 50.72% 49.28% 100.00%
Mech 58.97% 41.03% 100.00%
Acoustics 50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Optics 39.84% 60.16% 100.00%
Auto-Rel 43.06% 56.94% 100.00%
Ener-Rel 58.33% 41.67% 100.00%
Comm-Rel 60.98% 39.02% 100.00%
Share of 54.00% 46.00% 100.00%
Total
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Table 9
Number of Applications Filed by Area of Technology
Pharm Med Dev Bio- Comp Soft- Semi- Elec
Tech -Rel ware Cond
Total # US 177 98 88 357 109 131 97
apps Filed
Median 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std. Dev. 1.66 0.94 1.55 1.00 0.81 0.76 0.57
Max 7 5 6 8 5 4 3
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Average 2.27 1.53 2.38 1.48 1.43 1.41 1.26
Margin of 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06
Error +I- I
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Total # US 390 426 27 204 82 38 54
apps Filed
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.36 0.72 0.61 1.10 0.39 1.14 0.65
Max 9 6 3 8 3 6 4
Min 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Average 1.88 1.29 1.23 1.59 1.14 1.58 1.32
Margin of 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.24 0.10
Error +1- I
Mech Chem Elec
Total # US 491 543 465
apps filed
Median 1 1 1
Mode 1 1 1
Std Dev 0.75 1.33 0.85
Max 6 9 8
Min 0 1 1
Average 1.31 1.86 1.39
Margin of 0.04 0.08 0.05
Error +"-/-
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Table 10
Time in Prosecution by Area of Technology
Pharm Med Dev Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg yrs in 4.46 2.76 4.72 2.82 3.15 2.73 2.12
PTO
Median 3.24 2.33 3.91 2.42 2.78 2.33 1.86
Mode #NIA 1.35 #N/A 1.82 1.82 1.35 1.57
Std Dev 2.95 1.41 2.71 1.56 1.58 1.48 0.94
Max 12.79 7.68 10.38 10.22 10.22 8.81 5.42
Min 1.02 1.01 0.71 0.82 1.07 1.10 0.67
Margin of 0.33 0.18 0.45 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.11
Error +/- I I _
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg yrs in 3.52 2.27 2.66 2.81 2.20 2.74 2.64
PTO
Median 2.59 1.97 2.11 2.39 2.08 1.87 2.52
Mode 1.70 1.53 2.84 2.45 2.16 3.09 2.85
Std Dev 2.59 1.13 1.51 1.61 0.82 1.62 1.01
Max 18.15 8.52 6.21 8.81 4.89 8.11 6.11
Min 0.93 0.73 1.04 0.82 0.76 0.94 0.94
Margin of 0.18 0.06 0.33 0.14 0.10 0.34 0.16
Error +/-
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Table 11
Entity Size By Area of Technology
Indiv Sm Bus Non- Tot Sm Large Total
profit Ent Ent (Sm+ Lrg)
Pharm 11 12 1 24 54 78
Med Dev 16 17 2 35 29 64
BioTech. 2 6 2 10 27 37
Comp-Rel 18 17 2 37 205 242
Software 5 3 2 10 66 76
Semi-Cond 5 5 1 11 82 93
Elec 13 9 1 23 54 77
Chem 20 9 2 31 176 207
Mech 114 59 2 175 154 329
Acoustics 5 1 0 6 16 22
Optics 10 6 2 18 110 128
Auto-Rel 7 4 0 11 61 72
Ener-Rel 2 1 1 4 20 24
Comm-Rel 6 3 0 9 32 41
Total 234 152 18 404 1086 1490
Indiv Small Non- Tot Sm
Bus profit Ent
Pharm 45.83% 50.00% 4.17% 100.00%
Med Dev 45.71% 48.57% 5.71% 100.00%
BioTech. 20.00% 60.00% 20.00% 100.00%
Comp-Rel 48.65% 45.95% 5.41% 100.00%
Software 50.00% 30.00% 20.00% 100.00%
SemiCond 45.45% 45.45% 9.09% 100.00%
Elec 56.52% 39.13% 4.35% 100.00%
Chem 64.52% 29.03% 6.45% 100.00%
Mech 65.14% 33.71% 1.14% 100.00%
Acoustics 83.33% 16.67% 0.00% 100.00%
Optics 55.56% 33.33% 11.11% 100.00%
Auto-Rel 63.64% 36.36% 0.00% 100.00%
Ener-Rel 50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 100.00%
Comm-Rel 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 100.00%
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Table 12
Number of Inventors by Area of Technology
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg # 2.81 2.33 2.84 2.28 2.42 2.13 2.48
Inventors
Median 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mode 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Std Dev 1.73 1.72 1.91 1.49 1.55 1.35 1.66
Max 9 10 11 10 10 7 10
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Margin of 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.19
error +/-
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Tot Tot Lrg Total
Sm Ent
Ent
Pharm 30.77% 69.23% 100.00%
Med Dev 54.69% 45.31% 100.00%
BioTech. 27.03% 72.97% 100.00%
Comp-Rel 15.29% 84.71% 100.00%
Software . 13.16% 86.84% 100.00%
SemiCond 11.83% 88.17% 100.00%
Elec 29.87% 70.13% 100.00%
Chem 14.98% 85.02% 100.00%
Mech 53.19% 46.81% 100.00%
Acoustics 27.27% 72.73% 100.00%
Optics 14.06% 85.94% 100.00%
Auto-Rel 15.28% 84.72% 100.00%
Energy-Rel 16.67% 83.33% 100.00%
Comm-Rel 21.95% 78.05% 100.00%
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Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # 2.85 1.77 1.86 2.57 2.07 2.79 2.27
Inventors
Median 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Mode 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.71 1.18 0.99 1.76 1.29 2.08 1.38
Max 10 9 4 10 7 9 7
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Margin of 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.22
error +1-
Table 13
U.S. Patent References
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg # US 6.06 19.44 4.59 10.21 9.59 6.49 9.35
pat ref
Median 3 12 2 7 7 5 7
Mode 0 5 0 6 5 2 4
Std Dev 10.14 22.60 7.40 11.43 12.90 5.20 11.32
Max 76 137 38 112 112 25 87
Min 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # US 9.94 12.70 8.95 10.16 12.36 14.63 10.56
pat ref
Median 6 8 7 7 8 10 6
Mode 3 6 4 5 7 10 6
Std Dev 12.44 14.33 5.98 14.19 13.88 16.94 14.50
Max 82 137 19 137 68 82 87
Min 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
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Foreign Patent References
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg # For 2.60 2.84 2.97 1.77 1.26 1.57 1.66
pat ref
Median 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 3.84 5.80 7.36 2.72 2.39 2.17 2.93
Max 24 36 43 16 12 10 18
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Margin of 0.43 0.72 1.23 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.33
error +/- I
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # For 3.63 2.60 1.82 2.14 3.83 1.79 1.66
pat ref
Median 2 1 0 1 2 2 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 4.62 4.21 3.53 3.09 4.83 1.98 3.40
Max 24 36 15 17 19 6 18
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Margin of 0.32 0.23 0.78 0.27 .57 .42 .54
error +I-
Non-patent References
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg# 9.88 3.56 16.30 2.75 3.54 1.34 0.83
non-pat
ref
Median 5 0 15 0 1 0 0
Mode 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 12.60 10.55 12.68 7.56 7.33 3.03 2.32
Max 68 67 68 63 36 19 14
Min 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2000]
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Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # 3.43 0.53 2.45 2.72 0.63 0.75 2.41
non-pat
ref
Median 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 6.92 1.83 6.35 7.43 1.64 1.15 9.84
Max 55 19 30 67 8 3 63
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Prior Art References
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg # 18.55 25.84 23,86 14.74 14.39 9.41 11.84
total art
ref
Median 12 15 17 10 10 8 9
Mode 1 11 8 7 7 5 4
Std Dev 18.34 29.86 20.19 17.14 17.15 6.59 13.75
Max 83 163 93 137 137 30 105
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # 17.00 15.84 13.23 15.02 16.82 17.17 14.63
total art
ref
Median 11 11 10 10 10 14 8
Mode 8 5 19 7 7 25 6
Std Dev 17.11 16.75 11.72 18.53 16.50 17.76 23.05
Max 101 163 58 163 84 87 118
Min 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 14
Total Claims
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg# 14.99 17.05 13.30 16.02 17.11 15.83 15.47
total
claims
Median 11 13 9 12 11 13 13
Mode 8 27 7 3 9 6 10
Std Dev 13.22 12.61 9.42 13.83 18.43 11.93 12.22
Max 82 61 36 120 120 64 57
Min 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
Margin of 1.49 1.58 1.57 0.88 2.11 1.23 1.39
error +/-
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg# 15.19 13.36 18.64 16.13 14.89 15.63 16.24
total
claims
Median 14 11 17 14 13 13 12
Mode 15 10 16 20 10 10 9
Std Dev 10.67 9.45 9.52 14.21 10.04 9.25 12.91
Max 82 55 43 120 55 40 49
Min 1 1 6 1 2 3 1
Margin of 0.73 0.51 2.11 1.24 1.18 1.95 2.04
error +/- I
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Independent Claims
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg # ind 2.86 3.31 3.30 3.27 3.53 3.03 2.56
claims
Median 2 3 3 3 3 3 2
Mode 1 3 2 1 2 1 1
Std Dev 2.20 3.08 2.36 2.54 2.75 2.21 1.59
Max 11 17 10 17 16 11 8
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg # ind 2.22 2.56 3.59 2.95 2.75 3.88 3.44
claims
Median 2 2 4 2 3 3 2
Mode 1 1 1 2 3 3 2
Std Dev 1.63 2.30 2.28 2.15 1.63 4.79 2.94
Max 11 24 10 16 8 24 14
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dependent Claims
Pharm Med Bio- Comp- Soft- Semi- Elec
Dev Tech Rel ware Cond
Avg# dep 12.13 13.73 10.00 12.75 13.58 12.80 12.91
claims
Median 8 12 6 10 9 10 10
Mode 7 8 4 2 10 8 2
Std Dev 12.75 10.81 8.76 12.49 17.11 10.86 11.50
Max 80 44 34 115 115 55 51
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Chem Mech Acous Optics Auto- Ener- Comm-
Rel Rel Rel
Avg# dep 12.97 10.80 15.05 13.18 12.13 11.75 12.80
claims
Median 11 9 15 11 11 10 9
Mode 14 7 16 2 2 12 5
Std Dev 10.19 8.43 8.07 13.50 9.45 9.01 10.77
Max 80 47 33 115 47 37 38
Min 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Table 15
Number of Applications Filed by Country of Origin
US CA JA KO AU TW
Total# US 865 27 317 32 7 24
apps filed
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.12 1.18 0.95 0.54 0.41 0
Max 9 5 8 3 2 1
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mean 1.60 1.59 1.50 1.28 1.17 1.00
Margin of 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.00
Error +/-
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Total # US 29 76 47 18 8 16
apps filed
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.02 0.53 1.03 0.96 0 0.89
Max 5 4 5 4 1 4
Min 1 0 1 1 1 1
Mean 1.53 1.15 1.52 1.38 1.00 1.33
Margin of 0.25 0.07 0.19 0.29 0.00 0.28
Error +I- _ I II
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Table 16
Time Spent in Prosecution by Country of Origin
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg yrs in 2.92 2.98 2.76 2.29 3.57 1.32
PTO
Median 2.33 2.10 2.37 2.13 1.95 1.30
Mode 1.35 #N/A 1.46 #N/A #N/A 1.27
Std Dev 1.99 2.16 1.45 0.93 4.00 0.35
Max 18.15 9.70 8.96 4.77 11.67 2.19
Min 0.69 1.51 0.94 1.13 1.47 0.67
Margin of 0.08 0.55 0.10 0.19 2.10 0.07
Error +/-
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg yrs in 3.50 2.37 2.65 2.71 1.83 2.40
PTO
Median 2.37 2.15 2.32 2.12 1.94 1.86
Mode #N/A 1.63 2.85 #N/A 1.95 #NIA
Std Dev 2.82 1.36 1.32 1.54 0.53 1.74
Max 12.79 10.22 6.20 6.45 2.54 7.34
Min 1.28 0.82 1.01 1.22 1.18 1.03
Margin of 0.68 0.17 0.24 0.46 0.22 0.55
Error +1- I I
Avg yrs in
PTO
Median
Mode
Std Dev
Max
Min
Margin of
Error +1-
US
2.92
2.33
1.35
1.99
18.15
0.69
0.08
Non-
US
2.60
2.17
1.82
1.56
12.79
0.67
0.07
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Table 18
Number of Inventors by Country of Origin
US CA JA KO AU TW UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg# 2.14 1.47 2.75 1.48 1.00 1.42 2.26 2.45 2.48 2.08 2.25 2.17
Inven-
tors
Median 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 2 1 2 2
Std Dev 1.36 0.62 1.84 0.77 0.00 0.65 2.05 1.59 2.01 1.38 1.98 1.27
Max 10 3 10 4 1 3 10 8 11 5 7 5
Min 1 1 1 1 11111 1 1 1 1
Non-
US
2.38
2
1
1.69
11
1
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Table 17
Small Entity Status by Country of Origin
Small Entities % of National
Total
US 217 40.19%
CA 10 58.82%
JA 7 3.30%
KO 3 12.00%
AU 4 66.67%
TW 20 83.33%
UK 5 26.32%
GE 5 7.58%
FR 4 12.90%
IT 4 30.77%
SW 5 62.50%
NE 2 16.67%
Avg #
Inventors
Median
Mode
Std Dev
Max
Min
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Table 19
U.S. Patent References
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg # US 13.85 9.82 6.09 5.68 3.83 5.63
pat ref
Median 9 7 5 5 5 6
Mode 7 5 4 3 5 6
Std Dev 15.21 8.42 4.27 3.66 1.94 3.21
Max 137 29 29 14 6 13
Min 0 0 0 1 1 0
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg # US 6.21 6.21 5.48 5.00 5.50 6.17
pat ref
Median 5 6 5 4 5 5
Mode 1 6 2 4 2 5
Std Dev 5.45 5.39 4.03 3.74 3.55 4.09
Max 18 37 15 14 12 15
Min 0 0 0 0' 2 1
Foreign Patent References
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg # for 2.03 1.76 3.03 0.52 3.83 0.33
pat ref
Median 0 0 2 0 2 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 1 0
Std Dev 4.24 3.19 3.46 0.82 4.17 0.76
Max 43 11 18 3 10 3
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg# For 4.95 4.33 2.94 2.54 2.88 2.92
pat ref
Median 4 4 2 2 3 3
Mode 0 4 0 0 2 3
Std Dev 5.73 4.45 3.00 2.50 2.42 2.57
Max 24 26 12 7 7 7
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Non-Patent References
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg # 3.41 0.65 1.16 0.20 9.17 0.13
non-pat
ref
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 8.19 1.11 2.50 1.00 22.45 0.34
Max 68 4 19 5 55 1
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg # 2.79 0.79 1.06 1.38 0.63 1.67
non-pat
ref
Median 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mode 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 5.84 1.40 2.22 1.80 1.06 3.39
Max 19 8 10 5 3 12
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Prior Art References
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg# 19.29 12.24 10.28 6.40 16.83 6.08
total pat
ref
Median 13 7 9 5 6 6
Mode 7 2 7 5 6 5
Std Dv 20.07 11.24 6.58 4.04 26.09 3.51
Max 163 37 47 15 70 16
Mi 0 1 1 1 5 2
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UK GE. FR IT SW NE
Avg # 13.95 11.33 9.48 8.92 9.00 10.75
total pat
ref
Median 12 10 9 7 7 9
Mode 1 10 14 7 6 8
Std Dev 12.31 8.59 5.03 5.01 4.34 7.89
Max 49 64 22 20 16 30
Min 1 1 1 4 5 2
Table 20
Number and Type of Prior Art References by
Country of Origin
US Non-US
Avg # US 13.85 6.23
pat ref
Median 9 5
Mode 7 5
Std Dev 15.21 4.86
Max 137 37
Min 0 0
US Non-US
Avg # 3.41 1.16
non-pat
ref
Median 0 0
Mode 0 0
Std Dev 8.19 3.49
Max 68 55
Min 0 0
US Non-US
Avg # for pat ref 2.03 2.93
Median 0 2
Mode 0 0
Std Dev 4.24 3.58
Max 43 26
Min 0 0
US Non-US
Avg # total pat ref 19.29 10.31
Median 13 9
Mode 7 7
Std Dev 20.07 7.82
Max 163 70
Min 0 1
2168
2000] WHO'S PATENTING WHAT?
Table 21
Number and Type of Claims by Country of Origin
Independent Claims
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg# 2.95 2.53 2.93 2.88 4.17 1.21
ind
claims
Median 2 3 2 2 3 1
Mode 1 3 1 2 3 1
Std Dev 2.31 1.12 2.44 2.52 3.43 0.66
Max 24 4 16 11 11 4
Min 1 1 1 1 2 1
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg # 2.21 1.98 2.23 2.23 1.38 2.25
ind
claims
Median 2 2 2 2 1 2
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.32 1.41 1.56 1.54 0.74 1.71
Max 5 7 7 5 3 6
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dependent Claims
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg# 13.82 13.76 9.91 7.60 11.67 2.83
dep
claims
Median 12 12 8 5 13 2
Mode 5 8 4 3 11 0
Std Dev 11.66 8.87 9.23 8.84 6.44 2.96
Max 115 38 51 44 19 11
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
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UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg# 12.05 10.09 12.06 11.69 12.63 13.75
dep
claims
Median 12 9 11 8 11 13
Mode 17 7 0 4 #N/A 18
Std Dev 5.89 6.93 8.37 11.14 10.03 8.32
Max 26 29 34 45 26 28
Min 2 0 0 4 0 1
Total Claims
US CA JA KO AU TW
Avg # 16.78 16.29 12.83 10.48 15.83 4.04
total
claims
Median 14 14 10 8 17 3
Mode 20 10 6 4 17 2
Std Dev 12.65 8.84 10.41 10.48 7.28 2.96
Max 120 41 57 52 23 12
Min 1 1 1 2 3 1
UK GE FR IT SW NE
Avg # 14.26 12.09 14.29 13.92 14.00 16.00
total
claims
Median 14 11 13 10 12 15
Mode 19 14 10 10 #NIA #NIA
StdDev 6.45 7.40 8.31 11.84 10.36 9.14
Max 30 35 37 50 29 32
Mi 3 2 1 5 1 4
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Table 22
Number and Type of Claims by Country of Origin
US Non-US US Non-US
Avg # 2.95 2.52 Avg # 13.82 10.12 Avg #
ind dep total
claims claims claims
Median 2 2 Median 12 8 Median
Mode 1 1 Mode 5 2 Mode
Std Dev 2.31 2.08 Std Dev 11.66 8.56 Std Dev
Max 24 16 Max 115 51 Max
Min 1 1 Min 0 0 Min
US
16.78
14
20
12.65
120
1
Non-US
12.64
10
10
9.43
57
1
Table 23
Number of Applications Filed by Small Entity Status
Sm Ent Lg Ent
Total # US 426 1073
apps filed
Median 1 1
Mode 1 1
Std Dev 1.02 1.01
Max 9 8
Mi 1 1
Avg 1.45 1.52
Table 24
Time in Prosecution by Nature of Prior Application Filed
Priority Priority Priority Priority Priority
Based on Based on Based on Based on Based on
Instant Continua- Divisional CIP Foreign
Applica- tion Filing
tion
Avg yrs 1.99 5.23 4.78 5.06 2.66
in PTO
Median 1.84 4.72 4.18 4.31 2.23
Mode 1.70 4.10 3.49 3.23 2.85
Std Dev 0.76 2.55 2.61 2.73 1.55
Max 7.88 18.15 18.15 18.15 12.79
Min 0.67 1.36 1.28 1.53 0.82
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Table 25
Time in Prosecution by Entity Size
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg yrs in 2.60 2.55 3.62 2.62 2.83
PTO
Median 1.97 2.16 3.09 2.13 2.28
Mode 1.38 2.10 #N/A 1.38 2.11
Std Dev 2.05 1.30 2.33 1.83 1.81
Max 18.15 7.61 8.85 18.15 13.98
Min 0.67 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.69
Table 26
Number of Inventors by Entity Size
Indiv Small Bus Non-profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # 1.47 1.89 2.82 1.67 2.50
Inventors
Median 1 1 2 1 2
Mode 1 1 2 1 1
Std Dev 1.04 1.18 1.78 1.16 1.59
Max 10 7 7 10 11
Min 1 1 1 1 1
Table 27
Prior Art References by Entity Size
U.S. Patent References
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # US 13.03 11.41 10.36 12.34 9.52
pat ref
Median 9 8 5 9 6
Mode 6 5 25 6 5
Std Dev 12.89 10.67 10.69 12.04 12.25
Max 87 65 29 87 137
Min 0 0 0 0 0
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Foreign Patent References
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # For 1.63 2.17 0.82 1.80 2.71
Pat ref
Median 1 1 0 1 1
Mode 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 2.98 3.81 1.47 3.28 4.20
Max 21 19 4 21 43
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Patent References
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # non- 1.48 4.45 15.09 3.08 2.08
pat ref
Median 0 0 4 0 0
Mode 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev 5.12 11.04 20.82 9.08 5.15
Max 49 68 67 68 55
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Total References
Indiv Sm Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg# total 16.14 18.03 26.27 17.21 14.31
ref
Median 11 13 25 12 10
Mode 11 6 16 6 7
Std Dev 16.15 18.32 18.85 17.13 15.86
Max 105 118 72 118 163
Min 1 0 3 0 0
Margin of 1.20 1.76 6.33 0.98 0.59
Error +/-
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Table 28
Number and Type of Claims by Entity Size
Independent Claims
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # ind 2.23 3.36 3.45 2.69 2.78
claims
Median 2 3 3 2 2
Mode 1 2 1 1 1
Std Dev 1.54 2.99 2.84 2.29 2.19
Max 8 17 10 17 24
Min 1 1 1 1 1
Dependent Claims
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg# dep 11.15 14.16 28.45 12.90 11.80
claims
Median 10 13 12 11 9
Mode 0 3 35 5 2
Std Dev 8.91 10.88 32.63 11.76 9.93
Max 47 71 115 115 80
Min 0 0 1 0 0
Total Claims
Indiv Small Bus Non-Profit Tot Sm Ent Large Ent
Avg # 13.38 17.51 31.91 15.59 14.58
total
claims
Median 12 16 19 13 12
Mode 20 4 13 20 10
Std Dev 9.76 12.40 33.30 12.84 10.84
Max 55 80 120 120 82
Min 1 1 2 1 1
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